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WANTED: ITERATIVE, FLEXIBLE, AND 
PRO-COMPETITIVE PREFERRED 
Abstract: Since the creation of Bitcoin in 2009, the market for virtual currency 
has exploded with thousands of cryptocurrencies and trillions of dollars invested 
in cryptocurrency startups. Because of cryptocurrency’s popularity and potential 
to disrupt existing financial systems, the U.S. government understandably wants 
to regulate it. Overlapping federal and state regulatory approaches, however, cre-
ated a mess of confusing and hard-to-follow rules for cryptocurrency entrepre-
neurs. If executed correctly, regulation can have a pro-competitive and beneficial 
effect on fledgling industries. Regulation D in the venture capital industry and 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act safe harbors for Internet Service Providers 
offer two models of well-executed regulatory schemes. This Note argues that 
federal regulators must work together to create a straightforward and flexible 
regulatory scheme reminiscent of Regulation D and the safe harbors. Otherwise, 
the United States will continue to lose valuable innovation and economic benefits 
to countries with more streamlined cryptocurrency frameworks. 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a world in which one hundred percent of a deposited check’s 
funds become available almost immediately, with no third-party fees.1 Imagine 
a world in which an individual can pay an incredibly small amount of money, 
say, a hundredth of a penny, in order to read an online newspaper article with-
out irritating banner ads or the need to pay a subscription fee.2 Finally, imagine 
a world in which inboxes are free from pesky spam emails.3 Cryptocurrency 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Kevin V. Tu & Michael W. Meredith, Rethinking Virtual Currency Regulation in the Bitcoin 
Age, 90 WASH. L. REV. 271, 282 (2015). Currently, stock trades take two to three days to settle and 
bank loans average around twenty-three days. DON TAPSCOTT & ALEX TAPSCOTT, BITCOIN REVOLU-
TION: HOW THE TECHNOLOGY BEHIND BITCOIN IS CHANGING MONEY, BUSINESS, AND THE WORLD 59 
(2016). Transactions handled through the Bitcoin network typically take less than ten minutes. Id. 
Payment systems often charge 2–3% fees to facilitate a transaction between parties. Marc Andreessen, 
Why Bitcoin Matters, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2014), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/21/why-
bitcoin-matters/?searchResultPosition=1 [https://perma.cc/F84P-75KS]. 
 2 Andreessen, supra note 1. With Bitcoin, content creators like the New York Times could charge 
minimal amounts of money so that users could access just one article, video, section, or news alert of 
their choosing, without having to buy a monthly subscription. Id. 
 3 Id. Micropayments small enough to be trivial to the sender but significant enough to large-scale 
spammers could be required for an inbox to accept an incoming message, thereby deterring spammers 
and keeping inboxes clear. Id. 
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can make this world possible, but only if supported by a specifically tailored 
regulatory scheme.4 
Cryptocurrencies are electronic forms of currency that lack ties to a tradi-
tional system like a government or financial institution.5 They can be used to 
buy goods or services from any merchant that accepts them as forms of pay-
ment.6 Ownership and transfer of cryptocurrency is verified and secured 
through an encrypted process involving both a private and public key, safely 
eliminating the need for third-party processing or fees.7 
Investment in cryptocurrency startups exploded much like the dot-com 
craze in the 1990s, with more than one billion dollars invested in 2014 and 
2015.8 There are currently over twenty-seven thousand cryptocurrencies on the 
market, with more added every single day.9 Even large online retailers like 
Overstock.com have begun to accept cryptocurrency as a form of payment, 
which many regard as a significant step towards establishing Bitcoin as a uni-
versally accepted virtual currency.10 
                                                                                                                           
 4 See Tu & Meredith, supra note 1, at 282 (describing Bitcoin as a reasonable alternative to tradi-
tional currency); Andreessen, supra note 1 (positing various revolutionary real-world uses for crypto-
currency). 
 5 See Tu & Meredith, supra note 1, at 277 (describing Bitcoin as a type of virtual currency and 
comparing it to traditional forms of currency). 
 6 Id. 
 7 TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 6; see Omri Marian, A Conceptual Framework for the 
Regulation of Cryptocurrencies, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 53, 54–58 (2015), https://chicagounbound.
uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1035&context=uclrev_online  [https://perma.cc/NQ6Z-JUE2] 
(providing a broad overview of cryptocurrency). Each owner of cryptocurrency has a private key that 
aligns with the public blockchain and enables cryptocurrency transfer and sale. Dennis Chu, Note, 
Broker-Dealers for Virtual Currency: Regulating Cryptocurrency Wallets and Exchanges, 118 COL-
UM. L. REV. 2323, 2326 (2018). The encryption prevents “double-spending,” or the use of the same unit 
of cryptocurrency multiple times through illicit tactics, and ensures that only the owner of the crypto-
currency is able to transfer it. Id. 
 8 TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 9. There seem to be no signs of stopping the invest-
ment flow, which is close to doubling every year. Id. 
 9 See All Cryptocurrencies, INVESTING, https://investing.com/crypto/currencies [https://perma.cc/
DY5E-5PEW] (displaying a dynamic list of cryptocurrencies currently on the market). Bitcoin is by 
far the most popular form of cryptocurrency, but other high-growth cryptocurrencies include Ethere-
um, which was created to facilitate the use of “smart contracts,” and Ripple’s XRP, which is appealing 
to traditional financial institutions, like banks, that want to utilize its low-cost cross-border payment 
solutions. See Nathan Reiff, The 10 Most Important Cryptocurrencies Other Than Bitcoin, IN-
VESTOPEDIA (Jan. 8, 2020), https://investopedia.com/tech/most-important-cryptocurrencies-other-than-
bitcoin/ [https://perma.cc/DY8P-D7RH] (listing the ten most popular forms of cryptocurrency outside 
of Bitcoin); Martin Tillier, What Is a Cryptocurrency?, NASDAQ (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.
nasdaq.com/articles/what-cryptocurrency-2018-01-25 [https://perma.cc/L5HB-S9R6] (listing common 
cryptocurrencies). 
 10 Tu & Meredith, supra note 1, at 288. The day of the announcement that it would start accepting 
Bitcoin as a payment method, Overstock.com received close to 4% of its daily revenue from Bitcoin 
sales, or approximately $124,000. Id. Many other retailers now accept Bitcoin as payment, including 
the 75,000+ merchants who utilize the Shopify point-of-sale platform that allows businesses to accept 
many different forms of payment across multiple channels. Mark Macdonald, Cryptocurrency, 
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Given cryptocurrency’s potential to disrupt existing financial systems, 
governments understandably want to manage its impact.11 Regulations typical-
ly fit into three broad categories of rationale—economic, social, and adminis-
trative—though many times these justifications overlap.12 Innovators often 
bear the costs of administrative regulation both directly, in the form of licens-
ing fees, and indirectly, by dedicating time and money to compliance.13 Often-
times, large commercial firms are able to bear the cost of increased regulations 
better than individual users.14 
Cryptocurrency, in part due to its novelty, is currently subject to a com-
plex and costly regulatory regime.15 It is simultaneously considered a security, 
a commodity, and a unit of property depending on the regulatory agency han-
dling it and the type of cryptocurrency being considered.16 Cryptocurrency 
entrepreneurs warn that the United States is losing innovative startups to other 
countries with more established regulatory cryptocurrency schemes.17 Inves-
                                                                                                                           
SHOPIFY, https://help.shopify.com/en/manual/payments/alternative-payments/cryptocurrency [https://
perma.cc/YRM6-7HDS]; Shopify Point of Sale, SHOPIFY, https://www.shopify.com/pos [https://
perma.cc/N559-EJJ8]. 
 11 See Daniela Sonderegger, Note, A Regulatory and Economic Perplexity: Bitcoin Needs Just a 
Bit of Regulation, 47 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 175, 216 (2015) (noting the balance that governments 
must strike between regulating Bitcoin and giving innovators the freedom to self-regulate). 
 12 ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., FROM RED TAPE TO SMART TAPE: ADMINISTRATIVE 
SIMPLIFICATION IN OECD COUNTRIES 14 (2003) [hereinafter OECD REPORT]; Maria Manuel Leitão 
Marques & Leonor Bettencourt Nunes, Deepening the Freedom of Services Through Pro-Competitive 
Regulation 5–6 (Nov. 6, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2350701 
[https://perma.cc/7JX5-GL3R]. Economic regulations moderate the free market through price adjust-
ments or barriers to market entry; social regulations consider the public health and safety; and admin-
istrative regulations typically involve administrative protocols like paperwork that assists the govern-
ment in information-gathering. OECD REPORT, supra, at 14.  
 13 OECD REPORT, supra note 12, at 15. Should innovators be subject to a government enforce-
ment action as a result of the failure to keep up with these requirements, it could be catastrophic de-
pending on the legal and financial resources available to defend themselves. Andrew W. Torrance & 
Eric von Hippel, The Right to Innovate, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 793, 798. Needless and burdensome 
regulatory hurdles that cost time and money are called “red tape.” OECD REPORT, supra note 12, at 
14. See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, Reinventing Government and Regulatory Reform: Studies in the 
Neglect and Abuse of Administrative Law, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 405 (1996) (examining the goals of the 
legislative and executive branch that, when combined, may negatively affect the administrative state 
and increase red tape). 
 14 Torrance & von Hippel, supra note 13, at 796. Large commercial firms may also lobby for 
more government regulation to protect their competitive advantage and prevent others from entering 
the market. Id. 
 15 See Tu & Meredith, supra note 1, at 274–75 (positing that attempts to fit cryptocurrency into 
existing regulatory systems have been troublesome because they were not drafted for the unique quali-
ties of virtual currency). 
 16 Carol R. Goforth, U.S. Law: Crypto Is Money, Property, a Commodity, and a Security, All at 
the Same Time, 49 J. FIN. TRANSFORMATION 102, 103 (2019). 
 17 See Marshall Hayner, The United States Is in the Middle of a Global Blockchain Race—And Is 
Losing, NASDAQ (Nov. 9, 2018), https://nasdaq.com/article/the-united-states-is-in-the-middle-of-a-
global-blockchain-race-and-is-losing-cm1053798/ [https://perma.cc/49HY-8V8Y] (arguing that coun-
tries like China and Japan are far ahead of the United States in effectively regulating cryptocurrency 
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tors want the certainty that government regulation can provide, but, paradoxi-
cally, the lack of cryptocurrency regulation—and the subsequent lack of taxes 
or oversight—is why many of them initially found cryptocurrency to be an 
attractive investment.18 Either way, the regulatory uncertainty surrounding 
cryptocurrency is harmful to investors and entrepreneurs alike.19 
When innovation accelerates at a rapid speed there are natural limits on 
the government’s ability to adapt quickly to new technology.20 Today, technol-
ogy moves at a breakneck speed, often making it difficult for governments to 
comprehend and regulate its effects.21 The current mismatched jumble of both 
state and federal cryptocurrency regulations and definitions is an unfortunate 
result of technology innovations outpacing regulatory capacity and competing 
regulatory entities.22 
Regulation can have a pro-competitive impact if executed in a way that 
increases the number of players in the market.23 Two examples of industries 
flourishing under pro-competitive regulatory schemes are venture capital and 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs).24 In the technology and venture capital in-
                                                                                                                           
and collaborating with innovators in the space); Jeff Kauflin, Crypto Startups Are Fleeing the U.S.—
This Bill Is Trying to Stop Them, FORBES (Jan. 10, 2019), https://forbes.com/sites/jeffkauflin/2019/01/
10/crypto-startups-are-fleeing-the-usthis-bill-is-trying-to-stop-them/#25709a5c2267/ [https://perma.
cc/6YT3-FUFP] (providing an example of an entrepreneur hinting that he might move his cryptocur-
rency startup to Switzerland because of a lack of trust in lawmakers’ ability to regulate effectively); 
Laura Shin, Crypto Industry Frustrated by Haphazard Regulation, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/business/dealbook/crypto-industry-regulation.html/ [https://perma.cc/
N4P9-U62E] (arguing that if good actors cannot comply with regulations due to the lack of clarity, 
they will likely consider steering clear of the United States). 
 18 See Jay Adkisson, Bitcoin, Cryptocurrency and the Government Regulation Paradox, FORBES 
(Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jayadkisson/2018/01/29/bitcoin-cryptocurrency-and-
the-government-regulation-paradox/#3751cea35313 [https://perma.cc/9QHD-DA7Q] (describing the 
friction between the need for cryptocurrency regulation to promote price stability and the attractive-
ness of few regulations to investors). 
 19 James P. Brennan et al., The Curious Case of Crypto, 37 BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP. 8, 
14 (2018); see Stephen J. Obie & Mark W. Rasmussen, How Regulation Could Help Cryptocurrencies 
Grow, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 17, 2018), https://www.hbr.org/2018/07/how-regulation-could-help-
cryptocurrencies-grow [https://perma.cc/5QZK-4T3E] (positing that unclear cryptocurrency regula-
tions curb innovation because entrepreneurs fear breaking the law and investors are unsure about true 
valuations). 
 20 TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 296. It is impossible for any government to regulate 
all aspects of the economy, as there are too many players and too much technology to manage. Id. 
 21 Id. at 308; see Goforth, supra note 16, at 103 (describing the complex patchwork of cryptocur-
rency regulations). 
 22 See TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 308 (arguing that technology is evolving so 
quickly that it is difficult for regulatory institutions to manage them effectively); Goforth, supra note 
16, at 103 (explaining that the overlapping cryptocurrency regulations are a result of different regula-
tory agencies trying to exert jurisdiction over the new technology). 
 23 See Marques & Nunes, supra note 12, at 5 (describing the possibility of regulation removing 
market barriers and encouraging competition). 
 24 See Bruce Dravis, Public Advertising of Private Investment Offerings: The Operation and Is-
sues in Post-JOBS Act Regulation D, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 295, 301 (2013) (describing the ways in 
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dustry, Regulation D, through its iterative regulatory process, encouraged in-
vestment and facilitated frictionless fundraising for emerging growth compa-
nies.25 In the realm of the Internet, the intentionally flexible safe harbor provi-
sions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) offered vital copyright 
protections to ISPs and websites hosting third-party content.26 The market for 
cryptocurrency in the United States has thus far suffered from a lack of formal 
guidance, and Regulation D and the DMCA safe harbors serve as positive ex-
amples of how the government can effectively regulate transformative indus-
tries.27 Federal and state regulatory agencies must work together to issue regu-
lations that are both straightforward and flexible in order to allow the burgeon-
ing cryptocurrency industry to flourish.28 
Part I provides background on the passage and substance of Regulation D 
in 1982 and the DMCA safe harbors in 1998, as well as the current state of 
regulation in cryptocurrency.29 Part II discusses the commentary from support-
ers and detractors about the effectiveness and desirability of Regulation D, the 
DMCA safe harbors, and cryptocurrency regulations as they currently stand.30 
Part III argues that, in order to support the fledgling cryptocurrency industry 
and reap the economic benefits that accompany it, Congress must pass pro-
competitive, flexible, and straightforward regulations to give entrepreneurs 
certainty that the fruits of their innovation are safe and protected in the United 
States.31 
                                                                                                                           
which Regulation D has affected small issuers and capital formation in general since its inception in 
1982); Matthew Sag, Internet Safe Harbors and the Transformation of Copyright Law, 93 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 499, 504–05 (2017) (stating that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act safe harbors 
have proven to be a boon to the economy and the copyright system in the United States). 
 25 See Dravis, supra note 24, at 301 (stating that the goal of the adoption of Regulation D was the 
encouragement of capital formation). 
 26 See Sag, supra note 24, at 504–05 (elucidating the benefits of the safe harbors to copyright law 
for Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and the economy in general). 
 27 See Dravis, supra note 24, at 301 (describing the billions of dollars that have been raised under 
the Regulation D exception); Sag, supra note 24, at 504–05 (claiming that the safe harbors promoted 
the explosion of social networking platforms); Stefan Stankovic, State of Play: The SEC’s Current 
Positions on Cryptocurrency, CRYPTO BRIEFING (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.cryptobriefing.com/
state-of-play-the-secs-current-positions-on-cryptocurrency/ [https://perma.cc/8RNS-LVWL] (stating 
that regulatory uncertainty is the most relevant threat facing the cryptocurrency industry). 
 28 See TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 264 (arguing that there must be a stable regulato-
ry approach to curtail uncertainty for both innovators and investors); Goforth, supra note 16, at 107 
(quoting regulators that argue for a balance of regulatory oversight and innovation to allow new tech-
nologies to grow). 
 29 See infra notes 32–134 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 135–189 and accompanying text. 
 31 See infra notes 190–225 and accompanying text. 
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I. REGULATION D, THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT SAFE 
HARBORS, AND CRYPTOCURRENCY: AN UNLIKELY TRIO 
In the United States, the history of government regulation of business is 
long, storied, and divisive.32 Some consider regulation a pertinent tool to re-
move market barriers and bolster healthy competition.33 Others argue that reg-
ulation and a well-functioning free market are mutually exclusive.34 Either 
way, regulatory oversight has arguably been a part of the nation’s fabric since 
1887 with the formation of the Interstate Commerce Commission, created to 
regulate railroads, and is not likely to disappear anytime soon.35 
Regulation D under the Securities Act of 1933 and the DMCA safe har-
bors for ISPs are examples of regulations that had a pro-competitive impact on 
their respective industries, as they provided much-needed stability and direc-
tion.36 Regulation D created an inexpensive and frictionless avenue for small 
emerging companies to raise venture capital by exempting them from other-
wise strict securities reporting requirements, spurring the growth of dot-com 
companies in the 1990s.37 The DMCA safe harbors offered vital protection to 
ISPs from accusations of copyright infringement perpetuated by their users, 
allowing user-based websites like YouTube and Google to evolve into the 
powerhouses that they are today.38 
Cryptocurrency, much like the emerging dot-com companies and ISPs of 
the 1990s, offers cutting-edge innovation that carries the potential to transform 
an entire industry.39 Investors are flooding money into cryptocurrency compa-
                                                                                                                           
 32 See PEW RESEARCH CTR., LOW APPROVAL OF TRUMP’S TRANSITION BUT OUTLOOK FOR HIS 
PRESIDENCY IMPROVES 32 (2016), https://www.people-press.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2016/12/
12-08-16-December-political-release.pdf [https://perma.cc/5U44-98DJ] (describing a public research 
poll in which 45% of participants said that “regulation is necessary to protect the public interest” 
while 48% said that “government regulation of business usually does more harm than good”). Repub-
licans and Democrats surveyed took opposite views, with Republicans viewing government regula-
tions as more harmful than beneficial. Id. 
 33 See Marques & Nunes, supra note 12, at 2 (arguing that, in some economic sectors, regulation 
is the most effective, and oftentimes only, way to ensure fair competition). 
 34 Id. See generally HENRY HAZLITT, ECONOMICS IN ONE LESSON: THE SHORTEST AND SUREST 
WAY TO UNDERSTAND BASIC ECONOMICS (Three Rivers Press 1979) (1946) (espousing the libertarian 
view of free market economics and the dangers of government intrusion). 
 35 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 439 (2d ed. 1985). 
 36 See Dravis, supra note 24, at 301 (stating that Regulation D offerings have become so popular 
that, by 2012, the dollar amount of security offerings under Rule 506 dwarfed that of other offerings 
requiring registration); Sag, supra note 24, at 504–05 (stating that the safe harbors were vital in en-
couraging the growth of Web 2.0 businesses and the economy itself). 
 37 See Dravis, supra note 24, at 297–301 (providing a broad overview of Regulation D). 
 38 See Sag, supra note 24, at 511–15 (providing a summary of the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (DMCA) safe harbors). 
 39 See Peter S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law’s Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63, 
66 (2002) (describing the effects of the creation of the World Wide Web on content flow and ISPs); 
Robert B. Thompson & Donald C. Langevoort, Redrawing the Public-Private Boundaries in Entre-
preneurial Capital Raising, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1573, 1611–12 (2013) (describing the revolutionary 
2020] Regulation of Cryptocurrency 1155 
nies as they did with dot-com companies in the 1990s.40 Lack of regulation and 
rampant inflation of internet startup valuations helped to cause the dot-com 
crash, and many in the cryptocurrency industry are wary that its own bubble 
may similarly burst.41 Much like the dot-com companies sought regulation to 
defend ISPs and improve the quality of internet services, there are now calls to 
protect the cryptocurrency industry and foster its development.42 Regulation D 
and the DMCA safe harbors are examples of how the government has chosen 
to regulate transformative industries in the past, and they provide useful mod-
els for an effective cryptocurrency regulatory scheme.43 
Section A of this Part will explore cryptocurrency and its current regulato-
ry guidelines issued by various government agencies.44 Section B of this Part 
provides an overview of the safe harbor provisions of the DMCA and their role 
in the rapid rise of ISPs like Google and YouTube.45 Section C of this Part re-
views Regulation D and its effects on the fundraising in the emerging company 
and venture capital industry.46 
                                                                                                                           
policy shift towards allowing more individuals to be considered accredited investors based on their 
wealth, which would presumably increase investment flow for emerging companies from a variety of 
sources); Andreessen, supra note 1 (describing the parallels between the revolutionary effects of the 
Internet in 1993 and Bitcoin in 2014). 
 40 See TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 9 (“Venture capitalists are showing enthusiasm at 
a level that would make a 1990s dot-com investor blush.”). 
 41 See Kirill Bryanov, Irrational Exuberance Revisited: Is Crypto the New Dot-Com Bubble?, 
COINTELEGRAPH (Sep. 15, 2018), https://cointelegraph.com/news/irrational-exuberance-revisited-is-
crypto-the-new-dot-com-bubble/ [https://perma.cc/44UD-5X4F] (drawing parallels between the dot-
com crash and the hypothetical cryptocurrency bubble); Michael Patterson, Crypto’s 80% Plunge Is 
Now Worse Than the Dot-Com Crash, BLOOMBERG (Sep. 12, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2018-09-12/crypto-s-crash-just-surpassed-dot-com-levels-as-losses-reach-80 [https://
perma.cc/5RTK-MLLW] (comparing the dot-com crash with the decline in cryptocurrency value in 
late 2018 and describing the response from cryptocurrency proponents and opponents). 
 42 See Menell, supra note 39, at 137 (describing the passage of the safe harbor provisions as a 
result of lobbying by ISPs concerned about liability for user copyright infringement perpetuated on 
their platforms); see, e.g., Dan Robitzski, Here’s What One Judge’s Decision Means for the Future of 
Cryptocurrencies, FUTURISM (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.futurism.com/cryptocurrencies-sec-ico 
[https://perma.cc/XE8J-9LS5] (quoting a cryptocurrency venture capitalist stating that “[t]he industry 
is begging for regulators to provide clarity in order to thrive”). 
 43 See Dravis, supra note 24, at 297, 301 (recounting the passage of Regulation D and its benefi-
cial effects on the venture capital industry); Sag, supra note 24, at 506–12 (describing the develop-
ment of the Internet and copyright law alongside the passage of the DMCA safe harbors); Tu & Mere-
dith, supra note 1, at 296 (stating that cryptocurrency’s increased popularity has caused regulators to 
evaluate its risks due to regulatory concerns). 
 44 See infra notes 47–88 and accompanying text. 
 45 See infra notes 89–115 and accompanying text. 
 46 See infra notes 116–134 and accompanying text. 
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A. Cryptocurrencies and the Hodge Podge of  
Regulations Surrounding Them 
1. Cryptocurrencies, Bitcoin, and Initial Coin Offerings 
Cryptocurrencies are forms of digital assets exchanged in peer-to-peer 
transactions and recorded on public global ledgers—much like spreadsheets—
known as blockchain.47 Blockchain is a public log of all completed transac-
tions, wherein information about new transactions can be added, but old trans-
actions cannot be manipulated or edited due to cryptographic protections.48 
The blockchain is managed and updated collectively by each computer on the 
network rather than on a single central database.49 Owners of cryptocurrency 
possess an encrypted private key used to access the network and transfer the 
assets.50 After each transaction occurs, it is incorporated into the blockchain 
and documented on all computers in the network.51 Lauded as a safer, quicker, 
and cheaper alternative to traditional payments systems like credit cards ad-
ministered by a bank or other financial institutions, cryptocurrencies have ex-
ploded in growth.52 
Of the thousands of cryptocurrencies created since 2009, Bitcoin is the 
most well-known and heavily capitalized, and has become interchangeable 
                                                                                                                           
 47 TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 6; Chu, supra note 7, at 2326. Peer-to-peer exchanges 
occur directly between market participants without the need for third-party intervention. Andrew Mar-
shall, P2P Cryptocurrency Exchanges, Explained, COINTELEGRAPH (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.coin
telegraph.com/explained/p2p-cryptocurrency-exchanges-explained [https://perma.cc/E7WN-9NYB]. 
Not all ledgers are public and global. Computershare, Inc., Comment Letter on Transfer Agent Regu-
lations, at 23 (Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-27-15/s72715-35.pdf [https://perma.
cc/T622-G937] (distinguishing between “fully open” ledgers such as Bitcoin and “permissioned” 
distributed ledgers). 
 48 Arthur Iinuma, What Is Blockchain and What Can Businesses Benefit From It?, FORBES, (Apr. 
5, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesagencycouncil/2018/04/05/what-is-blockchain-and-
what-can-businesses-benefit-from-it/#419db91e675f [https://perma.cc/CM6R-A6RJ]. 
 49 TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 6; Chu, supra note 7, at 2326; see Brandon Ferrick, 
Note, Modernizing the Stockholder Shield: How Blockchains and Distributed Ledgers Could Rescue 
the Appraisal Remedy, 60 B.C. L. REV. 621, 649–55 (2019) (describing the function of blockchain 
technologies). The decentralized nature of cryptocurrency makes it difficult to hack because there is 
no central point of failure to attack. TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 6. 
 50 TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 6; Sonderegger, supra note 11, at 181–82. In addition 
to the private key, each user has a public key that is visible to all others in the network. Sonderegger, 
supra note 11, at 181. The two-key system has been compared to the system used to retrieve a safety 
deposit box involving both a bank guard key and an individual owner key. TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, 
supra note 1, at 6. 
 51 Sonderegger, supra note 11, at 181. 
 52 Andreessen, supra note 1; see Emerging Tech. from the arXiv, The Cryptocurrency Market Is 
Growing Exponentially, MIT TECH. REV. (May 29, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/
607947/the-cryptocurrency-market-is-growing-exponentially/ [https://perma.cc/U3PQ-U57P] (esti-
mating the market worth of cryptocurrency at $54 billion and stating that it is currently in a period of 
aggressive growth).  
2020] Regulation of Cryptocurrency 1157 
with cryptocurrency in the public conscience.53 Bitcoin itself has zero intrinsic 
value because it is not supported by a central authority like a government or 
bank, but Bitcoin can be exchanged for goods or services by any merchant that 
recognizes it as a viable means of payment.54 Bitcoin protects the privacy of 
users because it operates pseudonymously by assigning each individual a pri-
vate key that matches with the public blockchain, rather than utilizing person-
ally identifiable information.55 It also protects merchants because transactions 
cannot be reversed.56 
Bitcoin must be “mined” in order to verify transactions and safeguard the 
distributed ledger.57 The process of mining produces Bitcoin and serves to add 
transactions to the blockchain in the form of “blocks.”58 Mining, in essence, is 
the process of computers on the Bitcoin network competing to solve a complex 
math problem.59 The blockchain is updated and maintained because of the re-
sources exerted by these miners, so the winner receives Bitcoin as a reward for 
                                                                                                                           
 53 STANDING S. COMM. ON BANKING, TRADE, AND COMMERCE, DIGITAL CURRENCY: YOU CAN’T 
FLIP THIS COIN! 6, (Can. 2015), https://sencanada.ca/content/sen/Committee/412/banc/rep/rep12jun
15-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/7W82-EQ25] [hereinafter CANADIAN SENATE REPORT]; Goforth, supra 
note 16, at 106; Sarah Jane Hughes & Stephen T. Middlebrook, Advancing a Framework for Regulat-
ing Cryptocurrency Payments Intermediaries, 32 YALE J. ON REG. 495, 505 (2015). 
 54 Primavera de Filippi, Bitcoin: A Regulatory Nightmare to a Libertarian Dream, 3 INTERNET 
POL’Y REV., no. 2, 2014, at 2, https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/bitcoin-regulatory-nightmare-
libertarian-dream [https://perma.cc/8E6P-37DC]; Tu & Meredith, supra note 1, at 277. In contrast, a 
commodity-backed currency is one that is specifically exchangeable for a predetermined quantity of a 
good like gold or silver. de Filippi, supra, at 2. Similarly, legal tender, like the U.S. dollar, is a form of 
currency recognized by the government and required by law to be recognized by merchants. Tu & 
Meredith, supra note 1, at 278. Bitcoin is not currently considered legal tender, so no one is legally 
required to accept it as a form payment. Id. 
 55 See Chu, supra note 7, at 2326 (describing the process by which the private key and public 
blockchain operate together without the involvement of any personally identifiable information). 
 56 Tu & Meredith, supra note 1, at 283. Merchants lose money because customers fraudulently 
reverse transactions with their credit card companies and do not return the goods they purchased. Id. 
These merchants and credit card companies have no choice but to utilize very sensitive fraud detection 
programs that deny even minimally suspicious purchases, resulting in 5–10% of orders being turned 
away. Andreessen, supra note 1. 
 57 See de Filippi, supra note 54, at 1 (describing the importance of the mining process). The pro-
cess of mining was developed by the pseudonymous founder of Bitcoin, Satoshi Nakamoto, and was 
created in order to incentivize users to act as “auditors,” thereby increasing the safety and security of 
the network. See Adam Hayes, How Does Bitcoin Mining Work?, INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 21, 2019), 
https://www.investopedia.com/tech/how-does-bitcoin-mining-work [https://perma.cc/V7HK-UNPM] 
(describing the rationale behind rewarding miners with valuable Bitcoin for the work that they do). 
 58 Tu & Meredith, supra note 1, at 283; Sonderegger, supra note 11, at 182. 
 59 de Filippi, supra note 54, at 1; Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 53, at 505; L.S., How 
Bitcoin Mining Works, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 20, 2015), https://www.economist.com/the-economist-
explains/2015/01/20/how-bitcoin-mining-works [https://perma.cc/TM3W-KQYG]. Bitcoin miners are 
so numerous that they now have 13,000 times the computing power of the world’s top 500 supercom-
puters. L.S., supra. 
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solving the problem.60 After the miners verify the solution, the block is then 
added to the ledger and linked to its predecessor, creating the so-called block-
chain.61 The difficulty of the problem increases each time and a new block is 
created about every ten minutes.62 The maximum amount of Bitcoin allowed 
on the market is twenty-one million coins, and seventeen million have already 
been mined.63 
A new development in the cryptocurrency world involves initial coin of-
ferings (ICOs).64 Just as an initial public offering (IPO) involves raising money 
in capital markets, ICOs are mechanisms for companies to raise funds from 
investors in exchange for units of the company’s own cryptocurrency.65 Essen-
tially, the purchase of cryptocurrency in an ICO allows holders to engage in the 
market or product that the startup issuing it is trying to create.66 ICOs often 
occur before a product has been created or becomes functional, making them a 
fairly risky investment because the true value and potential success of the 
company or product is unclear.67 
Bitcoin was designed with the anticipation that it would not be regulated 
and after inception it functioned largely absent any regulatory engagement—its 
                                                                                                                           
 60 Arjun Kharpal, Everything You Need to Know About the Blockchain, CNBC (June 18, 2018), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/18/blockchain-what-is-it-and-how-does-it-work.html [https://perma.
cc/UL2T-7WE3]. 
 61 TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 7; Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 53, at 505; Tu 
& Meredith, supra note 1, at 284. 
 62 TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 7; Tu & Meredith, supra note 1, at 284. 
 63 Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 53, at 505; Evelyn Cheng, There Are Now 17 Million 
Bitcoins in Existence—Only 4 Million Left to ‘Mine,’ CNBC (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/
2018/04/26/there-are-now-17-million-bitcoins-in-existence—only-4-million-left-to-mine.html [https://
perma.cc/N23Y-Q2Y4]. Bitcoins, however, are not likely to run out soon as it is estimated that the 
remaining four million will take 122 years to mine. Cheng, supra. This is due to the increasing diffi-
culty—and therefore time—of mining each successive Bitcoin. Id. Some have argued that this very 
limit is what makes Bitcoin appealing, because it prevents governments from flooding the market with 
Bitcoin and minimizes inflation. Sonderegger, supra note 11, at 184. The twenty-one million Bitcoin 
limit was set by the Bitcoin founder and it is unclear why that number was chosen. Kai Sedgwick, 
Proposal to Increase Bitcoin’s 21 Million Supply Sparks Debate, BITCOIN.COM (Feb. 8, 2019), https://
news.bitcoin.com/proposal-to-increase-bitcoins-21-million-supply-sparks-debate/ [https://perma.cc/
8SKA-F7EW]. 
 64 Tamara Chuang, When Cryptocurrency and Regulators Collide, Blockchain Startups Just Want 
Clarity, DENVER POST (June 7, 2018), https://www.denverpost.com/2018/06/07/cryptocurrency-
regulation-blockchain-startups/ [https://perma.cc/N6GH-76B6]; What Is an ICO?, BITCOIN MAG., 
https://bitcoinmagazine.com/guides/what-ico [https://perma.cc/9K46-AAJC] (describing the first 
significant initial coin offerings (ICOs) that occurred in 2013, four years after the inception of the 
Bitcoin network). 
 65 BITCOIN MAG., supra note 64. These new units of cryptocurrency can be exchanged for fiat 
currency, like dollars, or other more established cryptocurrency like Bitcoin. Id. 
 66 Jay Preston, Note, Initial Coin Offerings: Innovation, Democratization, and the SEC, 16 DUKE 
L. & TECH. REV. 318, 320 (2018). 
 67 Id. at 323; BITCOIN MAG., supra note 64. 
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small user base likely factored into its ability to escape attention.68 But as 
Bitcoin’s popularity and the development of other cryptocurrencies have rocket-
ed it to the forefront of the public consciousness, its sudden visibility has com-
pelled international and domestic regulators to evaluate its risks and benefits.69 
2. Regulations from the IRS, FinCEN, CFTC, SEC, and the States 
Many U.S. government agencies have tried to classify cryptocurrency so 
that it fits into their own regulatory sphere, resulting in an overlapping and of-
ten contradictory patchwork of regulations.70 The first federal regulatory agen-
cy that issued guidance was the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Financial 
Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), which is tasked with monitoring fi-
nancial flows to deter illicit uses such as funding terrorism and money launder-
ing.71 In March 2013, FinCEN clarified requirements under the federal Bank 
Secrecy Act for parties in cryptocurrency transactions, defining virtual curren-
cy as a medium of exchange that “either has an equivalent value in real curren-
cy, or acts as a substitute for real currency.”72 FinCEN declared that anyone 
facilitating the exchange of such an asset would be considered a “money 
transmitter” required to report to the agency and adhere to FinCEN Bank Se-
                                                                                                                           
 68 Tu & Meredith, supra note 1, at 296; see Rip Empson, Bitcoin: How an Unregulated, Decen-
tralized Virtual Currency Just Became a Billion Dollar Market, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 29, 2013), 
https://techcrunch.com/2013/03/28/bitcoin-how-an-unregulated-decentralized-virtual-currency-just-
became-a-billion-dollar-market/ [https://perma.cc/KT2N-264E] (positing that the lack of government 
control over cryptocurrency made it an attractive choice for non-traditional investors). 
 69 Tu & Meredith, supra note 1, at 296; see Saheli Roy Choudhury, Governments Want to Control 
Cryptocurrencies—But There’s a Danger to Too Many Rules, CNBC (Sep. 12, 2017), https://www.
cnbc.com/2017/09/12/regulators-are-turning-their-attention-to-cryptocurrencies.html [https://perma.
cc/LG9J-PP52] (describing the renewed regulatory interest in cryptocurrency due to increased ICO 
activity in the United States, Singapore, Japan, and China). 
 70 Goforth, supra note 16, at 2. This complicated regulatory scheme is due in part to the fact that 
cryptocurrency does not legally conform to the existing definitions of “money” or “currency,” so there 
is much uncertainty over who will regulate it and what it means. Susan Alkadri, Note, Defining and 
Regulating Cryptocurrency: Fake Internet Money or Legitimate Medium of Exchange?, 17 DUKE L. & 
TECH. REV. 71, 76 (2018). 
 71 Goforth, supra note 16, at 103. This is accomplished by requiring financial institutions to ad-
here to a broad set of reporting and record-keeping requirements. Id. 
 72 FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINA-2013-G001, GUIDANCE: APPLI-
CATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING, EXCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL 
CURRENCIES 1 (Mar. 18, 2013), https://www.fincen.gov/resources/statutes-regulations/guidance/
application-fincens-regulations-persons-administering/ [https://perma.cc/KE2C-59TS]; Hughes & Mid-
dlebrook, supra note 53, at 507. 
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crecy Act requirements.73 The agency did not indicate how cryptocurrency it-
self should be classified, but did stress that it lacks the status of legal tender.74 
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued a notice in April of 2014 that 
it would treat cryptocurrency as property, not currency as FinCEN had 
claimed.75 As a result, the receipt of cryptocurrency through mining and gains 
or losses attributable to its sale must be reported to the IRS and will be treated 
as a capital gain or loss for taxation purposes.76 Anyone participating in trans-
actions involving cryptocurrency also must adhere to the reporting and record-
keeping practices required of stock traders.77 The IRS has proven to be aggres-
sive in monitoring these trades and recently won a ruling to require Coinbase, 
a popular cryptocurrency exchange platform, to hand over information about 
fourteen thousand accounts in order to investigate whether the participants 
properly paid taxes on cryptocurrency profits.78 
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the agency re-
sponsible for the regulation of commodities, futures, and derivatives, released 
a cryptocurrency “primer” in 2017 in which it utilized the IRS definition of 
virtual currency.79 If a unit of cryptocurrency aligns with that definition, the 
CFTC considers it a commodity, and therefore regulable by the agency.80 
                                                                                                                           
 73 Goforth, supra note 16, at 103. This decision had the effect of potentially imposing federal 
regulatory reporting rules designed for actual money transmitters on cryptocurrency issuers who may 
never have intended for their assets to be considered currencies. Id. 
 74 Alkadri, supra note 70, at 76; Sonderegger, supra note 11, at 189–90; see Tu & Meredith, su-
pra note 1, at 278 (defining legal tender as a form of currency recognized by the U.S. government and 
required to be accepted as payment by law). 
 75 I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, 2014-16 I.R.B. 938, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb14-16.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8VF4-9UJK]; de Filippi, supra note 54, at 7; Goforth, supra note 16, at 104. 
 76 Brennan et al., supra note 19, at 13; de Filippi, supra note 54, at 7; Hughes & Middlebrook, 
supra note 53, at 500. 
 77 Goforth, supra note 16, at 104. This classification also preempted taxpayers from claiming the 
favorable tax treatment available for foreign currency gains or losses in the context of cryptocurrency. 
Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 53, at 500. 
 78 United States v. Coinbase, Inc., No. 17-cv-01431-JSC, 2017 WL 5890052, at *8 (N.D. Cal. 
Nov. 28, 2017); Robert Anello, Bitcoin Buyers Beware: The IRS Has Your Number, FORBES (Jan. 10, 
2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2018/01/10/bitcoin-buyers-beware-the-irs-has-your-
number/ [https://perma.cc/FX3Y-34HJ]. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) initiated the litigation 
after discovering that each year from 2013 to 2015, fewer than nine hundred individuals reported 
losses or gains from cryptocurrency transactions on their tax returns despite the virtual currency ex-
ploding in value. Anello, supra. 
 79 COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, A CFTC PRIMER ON VIRTUAL CURRENCIES 4 
(2017), https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/documents/file/labcftc_primer
currencies100417.pdf [https://perma.cc/GX74-GRXX]; Goforth, supra note 16, at 105; Weizhen Tan, 
Cryptocurrency Regulation Requires a ‘Do No Harm’ Approach, US Regulator Says, CNBC (Sept. 14, 
2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/14/do-no-harm-in-regulating-cryptocurrencies-but-be-vigilant-
cftc.html [https://perma.cc/SK2W-9NUQ]; see I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, supra note 75, at 938 (defining 
virtual currency as “a digital representation of value that functions as a medium of exchange, a unit of 
account, and/or a store of value” that may operate like real currency but is not technically legal ten-
der). The IRS treats cryptocurrency as property for tax purposes but considers it a form of virtual 
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The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the agency responsible 
for regulating the U.S. securities market, considers an asset to be a security 
under its jurisdiction if, inter alia, it is sold as an “investment contract.”81 In 
SEC v. Howey Co., the Supreme Court set out a four-factor test used to deter-
mine whether a transaction can be classified as an investment contract and thus 
needs to be registered with the SEC: whether there was 1) an investment of 
money, 2) in a common enterprise, 3) with an expectation of profits, 4) to 
come solely from the efforts of others.82 The SEC has concluded that the issu-
ance of any new cryptocurrencies in an ICO will be considered a sale of secu-
rities, but Bitcoin itself is not considered a security.83 
States also regulate cryptocurrency, but have taken different approaches.84 
This can be harmful to cryptocurrency businesses whose online customers hail 
from many different places because they are subject to multiple different state 
regulatory approaches, in addition to the federal regulatory oversight.85 
Various nations with differing systems of government—ranging from au-
thoritarian regimes like Russia to democratic countries like Argentina—have 
banned or aggressively limited cryptocurrency, though some are reconsidering 
                                                                                                                           
currency and elucidates a definition of such in an IRS Notice to the public published in 2014. I.R.S. 
Notice 2014-21, supra note 75, at 938. 
 80 Goforth, supra note 16, at 105; Tan, supra note 79. The Chairman of the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC) has expressed concern over potential manipulation and fraud in the 
market for cryptocurrency, which may explain its adherence to the broad definition perpetuated by the 
IRS. Tan, supra note 79. Some cryptocurrencies have been found to fit within this definition, and in 
2018 a federal judge backed CFTC oversight of a supposed commodity when the judge allowed the 
regulatory agency to charge a cryptocurrency company with misappropriation of investor funds. Mar-
in Marinov, Some Cryptocurrencies Are Commodities Under CFTC Oversight, US Judge Rules, 
CRYPTOVEST (Sept. 28, 2018), https://cryptovest.com/news/some-cryptocurrencies-are-commodities-
under-cftc-oversight-us-judge-rules/ [https://perma.cc/8SPD-Y6SZ]. 
 81 Goforth, supra note 16, at 106; see Stankovic, supra note 27 (describing the role of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC)). 
 82 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946); Goforth, supra note 16, at 106; Stankovic, supra note 27. 
 83 Goforth, supra note 16, at 106; Kate Rooney, SEC Chief Says Agency Won’t Change Securities 
Laws to Cater to Cryptocurrencies, CNBC (June 6, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/06/sec-
chairman-clayton-says-agency-wont-change-definition-of-a-security.html [https://perma.cc/Z24Z-
8MAG]. Chairman of the SEC, Jay Clayton, affirmed this conclusion in a comment on cryptocurren-
cies, stating, “if it’s a security, we’re regulating it.” Rooney, supra. Bitcoin is not considered a securi-
ty because it is so popular and widespread that the market controls its profitability rather than some 
third party that an investor relies upon to generate financial gains. Goforth, supra note 16, at 106. 
 84 Stankovic, supra note 27. For example, New York uses the transfer value of Bitcoin in determin-
ing how to tax it while California uses the list price of the cryptocurrency. Emma Beyer, Bitcoin Tax 
Laws Virtually Nonexistent in States, BLOOMBERG L. (Sept. 12, 2018), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/
tech-and-telecom-law/bitcoin-tax-laws-virtually-nonexistent-in-states [https://perma.cc/PVF4-QY98]. 
 85 Goforth, supra note 16, at 103–04; see Jennifer L. Moffitt, The Fifty U.S. States and Crypto-
currency Regulations, COIN ATM RADAR (July 27, 2018), https://www.coinatmradar.com/blog/the-
fifty-u-s-states-and-cryptocurrency-regulations/ [https://perma.cc/2JBB-RR48] (outlining a compre-
hensive guide of the different state cryptocurrency regulations). 
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the restrictive regulations due to cryptocurrency’s increasing popularity.86 Oth-
er Western countries, including the United States and Canada, are making ef-
forts to regulate it more productively.87 For example, in 2015, a committee 
formed by the Canadian Senate released a comprehensive report detailing the 
positive effects of blockchain technology and recommending that the govern-
ment exercise caution in enacting regulations surrounding it.88 
B. Regulation D: The Savior of Venture Capitalists  
and Emerging Companies Alike 
Any sale or offering of securities in the United States must be registered 
with the SEC, unless it meets a statutory registration exemption.89 A registered 
public offering can be undesirable for small businesses due to intensive finan-
cial, temporal, and reporting requirements post-registration.90 One registration 
exemption, the private placement, by contrast, minimizes reporting require-
ments and allows companies of all sizes to fundraise from a variety of inves-
tors.91 As a result, most small businesses that want to participate in early stage 
financings try to qualify for a private placement exemption.92 
During the Reagan Administration, in 1982, the SEC renewed its focus on 
removing burdensome restraints on small business capital formation while re-
taining vital investor protections.93 As a significant part of these efforts, Regu-
                                                                                                                           
 86 TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 9; Andrey Ostroukh & Jack Stubbs, Russia Ready to 
Regulate, Not Ban Cryptocurrencies, REUTERS (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
russia-cryptocurrencies-bill/russia-ready-to-regulate-not-ban-cryptocurrencies-idUSKBN1FE0Y0 
[https://perma.cc/DEF5-Y6D7]. 
 87 TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 9. 
 88 See CANADIAN SENATE REPORT, supra note 53, at 7–8 (cautioning that additional regulations 
could stifle the future positive benefits of cryptocurrency and acknowledging that the rapid develop-
ment of cryptocurrency could make the challenges identified within it obsolete in a matter of years). 
 89 Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2018). A security is defined as “any note, stock, 
treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or 
participation in any profit-sharing agreement.” Id. § 80a-2(a)(36). 
 90 See Stuart R. Cohn & Gregory C. Yadley, Capital Offense: The SEC’s Continuing Failure to 
Address Small Business Financing Concerns, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1, 7–10 (2007) (detailing the many 
factors that make it impractical for small businesses to initiate a registered securities offering). Prepa-
ration expenses often total more than 10% of the offering. Id. at 8. Such expansive costs involve the 
utilization of multiple professionals including attorneys, underwriters, and accountants. Id. Ideally, an 
offering would take six months, but there is no guarantee of a quick preparation period or SEC review. 
Id. After going public, the company is required to participate in ongoing reporting in compliance with 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, requiring even more audit and advisory expenses. Id. at 9. 
 91 See Ilon Oliveira, Comment, Regulation of Rule 506 Private Placements: The Teetering Bal-
ance Between Investor Protection and Capital Formation, 45 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 287, 290–91 
(2015) (giving a general overview of private placements). 
 92 Cohn & Yadley, supra note 90, at 10. 
 93 See Mark A. Sargent, The New Regulation D: Deregulation, Federalism and the Dynamics of 
Regulatory Reform, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 225, 238–39 (1990) (attributing the emergence of Regulation D 
to the SEC’s increased focus on the ability of small businesses to raise capital during the conservative 
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lation D was adopted to promote capital formation and allow smaller issuers to 
avoid the prohibitive cost and effort of SEC registration.94 
The federal government now dominates securities regulation through the 
SEC, but state regulation of securities through “blue sky” laws stems back to 
1911.95 Historically, any securities offering was required to be registered with 
each state in which it was conducted in unless it fit within a state’s blue sky 
law exemption.96 State exemptions varied and were different from federal ex-
emptions, making it costly, burdensome, and highly undesirable to register 
with each state.97 As a result, Congress was continuously criticized by small 
companies for allowing state regulators to eviscerate the beneficial effect of 
federal regulations on capital formulation.98 In response to this pressure, Con-
gress passed the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 
(NSMIA), which preempted blue sky registration requirements in Regulation 
D offerings, specifically through the Rule 506 exemption.99 
In its original form, Regulation D consisted of three rules—Rule 504, 
Rule 505, and Rule 506—all of which create exemptions for reporting.100 The 
Rule 505 exemption was phased out in 2017 and incorporated into Rule 504.101 
                                                                                                                           
presidency of Ronald Reagan); Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 39, at 1611–12 (describing the 
“Reagan-era deregulatory impulse” that cast the old statutory protections for venture capital funding 
as meddlesome and needless). 
 94 Dravis, supra note 24, at 301; Oliveira, supra note 89, at 293; see Proposed Revision of Certain 
Exemptions from the Registration Provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 for Transactions Involving 
Limited Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6339, 23 SEC Docket 446 (Aug. 7, 1981) (“In 
response to some of those concerns, the Commission has taken a number of actions that are designed 
to assist small business capital formation and reduce the burdens imposed by the federal securities 
laws as applied to small businesses.”). 
 95 Elisabeth Keller & Gregory A. Gehlmann, Introductory Comment: A Historical Introduction to 
the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 331 (1988). 
Kansas enacted the first state securities law in 1911. Id. at n.14. Blue sky laws were aptly named be-
cause lawmakers were concerned that “if securities legislation was not passed, financial pirates would 
sell citizens everything in [the] state but the blue sky.” Id. at 331. 
 96 William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Rebalancing Private Placement Regulation, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
1143, 1152 (2013). 
 97 Cohn & Yadley, supra note 90, at 13; Sjostrom, supra note 96, at 1152. 
 98 See, e.g., Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The SEC’s Inglorious Role in Limiting Small Business’s 
Access to Capital, 9 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 28, 28 (2008) (describing how 
smaller-scale innovators are damaged by capital formation regulation and overlooked by the regula-
tors that devise such regulations). When there are minimal prospective purchasers in a state, issuers 
may choose not to seek registration in the state due to the high cost of investigating qualification 
standards, which is harmful not only to entrepreneurs but to the economic growth of the state itself. 
Cohn & Yadley, supra note 90, at 13. 
 99 Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (1996). 
 100 17 C.F.R §§ 230.501–.506 (1982). 
 101 See Wendy Gerwick Couture, Rest in Peace, Rule 505, 45 SEC. REG. L.J. 133, 138 (2017) (de-
scribing the reasoning behind and the aftermath of the Rule 505 phase-out). Rule 505 phased out 
largely because issuers exhibited preferences for Rules 506 and 504. Id. From 2009 to 2014, Rule 505 
made up only 1.5% of offerings, compared to 87.8% under Rule 506 and 10.7% under Rule 504. Id. at 
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Issuers that meet the criteria of any of the Regulation D exemptions need not 
register with the SEC, but must file an aptly-named “Form D” after their first 
sale of securities.102 
Rule 504 provides safe harbors for small public offerings, allowing issuers 
to offer up to five million dollars of securities within a twelve-month period, and 
does not require any specific disclosure to investors or verification that purchas-
ers are qualified.103 The rule also does not cap the number of investors allowed 
to participate in the offering; however, it is still subject to state securities laws, 
which is why the option is not as popular as its counterpart, Rule 506.104 
In an iterative regulatory process, the Jumpstart Our Business Startups 
Act of 2012 (JOBS Act) revised Rule 506 to provide for two exemptions from 
federal registration for private offerings, 506(b) and 506(c), which are distin-
guished based on the ability of issuers to use general solicitation and advertis-
ing.105 All securities offered under Rule 506 are considered “restricted,” mean-
                                                                                                                           
140. A state securities regulator once remarked that, “If someone calls and tells me that they’re plan-
ning a 505 offering, I know that they don’t know what they’re doing.” Id. 
 102 Fast Answers: Regulation D Offerings, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/fast-
answers/answers-regdhtm.html [https://perma.cc/GMK7-59SS]. A Form D must be filed with the SEC 
online within fifteen days after a security is sold and there is no filing fee associated with the form. 
Filing a Form D Notice, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/exemptofferings/
formd [https://perma.cc/3KQJ-BQXD]. 
 103 17 C.F.R § 230.504 (2017). The offering limit of Rule 504 increased from $1 million to $5 
million to eliminate any remaining need for Rule 505, whose only benefit was the higher monetary 
offering. Allan Grauberd & Anna Vasiliou Steele, The Revised Regulation D Rule 504 Exemption—
Bigger and Better, MOSES & SINGER (Dec. 15, 2016), https://s3.amazonaws.com/documents.lexology.
com/ab393e1e-7b1c-4b33-9299-f4fb382b95a8.pdf [https://perma.cc/WL5L-WZJE]. Rule 504 is de-
sirable to those businesses that want to sell a smaller amount of securities or that would have difficul-
ties meeting the costly and lengthy disclosure requirements of other securities offerings. Robert 
Wernli, Jr. & Elizabeth Chase, Rule 504 Becomes Useful Tool for Smaller Capital Raising and M&A 
Transactions, SHEPPARD MULLIN: CORP. & SEC. L. BLOG (Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.corporate
securitieslawblog.com/2016/11/rule-504-becomes-useful-tool-for-smaller-capital-raising-and-ma-
transactions [https://perma.cc/AZ8W-35QG]. 
 104 See 17 C.F.R § 230.504 (allowing an unlimited amount of investors so long as each is consid-
ered accredited); Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The SEC’s Regulation A+: Small Business Goes Under 
the Bus Again, 104 KY. L.J. 325, 342 (2015) (“Data show that approximately 80% of Regulation D 
offerings of $1 million or less are made as Rule 506 offerings.”). State securities laws can be cost-
prohibitive because they vary significantly, though most require issuers to file reporting documents 
and some create limits on the type and extent of the offering itself. James J. Cronin III, Comment, 
Access to Capital: Rethinking Local Crowdfunding, 38 CAMPBELL L. REV. 365, 396 (2016). 
 105 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (banning general solicitation and advertising in all offerings except for 
§§ 230.506(b)(1) and 230.506(c)). The Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012 (JOBS Act) more 
generally expanded the opportunities for securities issuers to raise money and in turn decreased dis-
closure obligations. Dravis, supra note 24, at 296–97. General solicitation and advertising is not ex-
plicitly defined in Rule 506, but Rule 502(c) sets forth examples such as “[a]ny advertisement, article, 
notice or other communication published in any newspaper, magazine, or similar media or broadcast 
over television or radio.” 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c)(1). The JOBS Act § 201(a)(1) directed the SEC to 
allow general advertising and solicitation under Rule 506 so long as all investors are accredited and 
the issuer takes steps to verify the identity of said investors. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ELIMINATING THE 
PROHIBITION AGAINST GENERAL SOLICITATION AND GENERAL ADVERTISING IN RULE 506 AND RULE 
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ing that unlike shares of stock purchased on the open market, they may not be 
sold for six months or a year without losing their exemption from federal regis-
tration.106 
In Rule 506(b) offerings, issuers of securities cannot use general advertis-
ing or solicitation, but they can sell securities to an unlimited number of ac-
credited investors for an unlimited amount of money.107 Should issuers decide 
to sell to non-accredited investors, they are limited to thirty-five individuals 
and are required to be available to answer prospective purchaser questions and 
to provide them with disclosure documents and financial statements.108 
In a radical departure from precedent, and partly in response to the ad-
vancements in modern communications technologies, Rule 506(c) allows a 
company to solicit and advertise their securities offerings.109 This change 
served to increase exposure to possible investors and minimize uncertainty 
about regulatory compliance for companies seeking to raise capital.110 To take 
advantage of this Rule, issuers must ensure that the investors who participate 
are all accredited, and they have an affirmative duty to take “reasonable steps” 
to verify that said purchasers are in fact accredited.111 In the first seven months 
of Rule 506(c)’s publication, close to nine hundred offerings were coordinated 
                                                                                                                           
144A OFFERINGS 4–5 (2013), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2013/33-9415.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5ZCJ-A9WN]. 
 106 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (listing the definition of and holding period for restricted securities). 
 107 Id. § 230.506(b). At an institutional level, accredited investors include banks and registered 
investment advisors. Id. § 230.501(a). At an individual level, a person (or a person and his or her 
spouse) must have a net worth greater than $1 million or an annual income of more than $200,000 for 
the past two years (or $300,000 with a spouse) to qualify as an accredited investor. Id. Presumably, 
accredited investors possess enough resources to be knowledgeable about securities transactions with-
out any legislative protection. Dravis, supra note 24, at 299. 
 108 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b). 
 109 See id. § 230.502(c) (allowing general solicitation and advertising in § 230.506(c)); Cohn & 
Yadley, supra note 90, at 6. Rule 506(c) uniquely allows market forces to guide how much and what 
kind of information is necessary to offer to the public in order to drive investment in securities offer-
ings. See Cheryl Conner, A Trillion Dollar Source of New Funding? The SEC’s New ‘Reg D’, FORBES 
(July 13, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/cherylsnappconner/2013/07/13/a-trillion-dollar-source-
of-new-funding-the-secs-new-reg-d/ [https://perma.cc/8KCB-XCXN] (explaining that because com-
panies are now able to solicit investments publicly, the amount of available information about their 
offerings will likely be determined by the requests of potential investors). 
 110 Elan W. Silver, Comment, Reaching the Right Investors: Comparing Investor Solicitation in 
the Private-Placement Regimes of the United States and the European Union, 89 TUL. L. REV. 719, 
721 (2015) (discussing the consequences of passage of Rule 506(c)). 
 111 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c). Rule 506(c) describes reasonable steps taken using a principles-based 
approach and could involve reviewing financial statements like W-2 forms or bank statements. Id.; 
KEEPING CURRENT: SEC Staff Issues Guidance on Verifying Accredited Investor Status, AM. BAR 
ASS’N (Aug. 14, 2014), https://americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2014/08/keeping_
current/ [https://perma.cc/B9YK-GQU7]. 
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in dependence on the new rule, resulting in the sale of over ten billion dollars 
in securities.112 
Regulation D proved to be a boon to the emerging company and venture 
capital industry.113 Since its adoption, the great majority of companies raising 
private capital have relied on Regulation D because of its inexpensive and less 
restrictive nature.114 As a result of the subsequent amendments to Regulation 
D, trillions of dollars of transactions have flowed through these exemptions, 
with no signs of stopping in the future.115 
C. Digital Millennium Copyright Act Safe Harbors: Protecting  
the Internet and Its Service Providers 
The deployment of the World Wide Web in the early 1990s created a new 
medium for content creation and sharing, and, in turn, increased opportunities 
for infringing copyrights.116 Copyrights are “original works of authorship fixed 
in any tangible medium of expression” and include, for example, musical 
works, motion pictures, and sound recordings.117 Early ISPs like Yahoo and 
American Online (AOL) expressed concern that copyright infringement accu-
sations could stagnate the growth of the Internet by making it impossible for 
their forums to permit third-party content uploads without fear of notoriously 
                                                                                                                           
 112 AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 111. During the same seven months, 9,200 offerings utilized the 
classic Rule 506(b) exemption, resulting in $233 billion of sales. Id. The Director of the SEC’s Division 
of Corporate Finance, Keith Higgins, attributed this discrepancy to a hesitancy surrounding the new rules 
regarding verification of accredited investors. Id. Subsequently, the SEC Staff issued more guidance on 
the meaning of “reasonable steps.” Id.; see Securities Act Rules, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.
sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/securitiesactrules-interps.htm [https://perma.cc/KS3R-N7CW] (an-
swering questions 260.35–260.38 regarding the meaning of “reasonable steps”). 
 113 Conner, supra note 109; Ryan Feit, New Regulations for Startup Capital Raising, INC. (Oct. 6, 
2015), https://www.inc.com/ryan-feit/new-regulations-for-startup-capital-raising.html [https://perma.
cc/F4MG-YFVL]. 
 114 Feit, supra note 113. 
 115 See SCOTT BAUGUESS ET AL., CAPITAL RAISING IN THE U.S.: AN ANALYSIS OF THE MARKET 
FOR UNREGISTERED SECURITIES OFFERINGS, 2009–2014, at 2 (2015), https://www.sec.gov/files/
unregistered-offering10-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Q5E-WLL8] (reporting that $1.3 trillion was 
raised through 33,429 Regulation D offerings in 2014). 
 116 Menell, supra note 39, at 66; see Sag, supra note 24, at 521 (asserting that the advent of the 
World Wide Web and the subsequent interconnectedness of people made it easy for near-perfect cop-
ies of songs to be exchanged between anyone with an Internet connection). In the age of analog devic-
es like VCRs and tape players, multiple iterations of copying resulted in substandard quality and cop-
yright enforcement actions mostly focused on large-scale pirating. Sag, supra note 24, at 521. With 
the advent of digital technology, copies are almost identical to the original and every person who 
owns a computer or smartphone may be able to perpetrate copyright infringement. Id. 
 117 The Copyright Act of 1976 § 102, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2018). In order to prove copyright in-
fringement, a plaintiff must demonstrate that they own a work and that the alleged infringer copied the 
protected elements of that work. Pasillas v. McDonald’s Corp., 927 F.2d 440, 442 (9th Cir. 1991). 
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high copyright infringement damages.118 A third-party user’s copyright infring-
ing uploads on the ISP’s platform could result in vicarious liability for the 
ISP.119 Congress responded by enacting the DMCA in 1998.120 
The DMCA contains five flexibly drafted safe harbors that put the onus 
on copyright owners to police infringement of their properties, and requires 
ISPs only to remove the material once the owners notify them of the infringe-
ment.121 These safe harbors protect both personal blogs and large companies 
such as Google; without them, copyright holders could sue the companies any 
time a third-party user uploaded infringing material onto their sites.122 Alt-
hough the safe harbors do not force platforms to act, the threat of losing pro-
tection from liability provides a strong enticement for ISPs to comply with the 
copyright notice-and-takedown regime envisioned by the DMCA.123 Almost all 
websites that contain third-party content try to fit into the safe harbor guide-
lines to avoid liability and accusations of breach of corporate fiduciary duty.124 
The DMCA protects the conduct of ISPs through four main safe harbor 
provisions: first, for companies that transmit, route, or connect infringing ma-
terial, like through the provision of internet access (the transmission safe har-
bor); second, for companies that cache or temporarily store infringing material 
(the caching safe harbor); third, for companies that passively host or store in-
fringing user material (the storage safe harbor); and fourth, for companies like 
Google that link or refer users to infringing material (the search engine safe 
                                                                                                                           
 118 Menell, supra note 39, at 137; see John Blevins, Uncertainty as Enforcement Mechanism: The 
New Expansion of Secondary Copyright Liability to Internet Platforms, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1821, 
1829 (2013) (elaborating on the consequences of uncertain legal standards for ISPs, including the high 
cost of litigation and the likelihood of damages). 
 119 See Christian C.M. Beams, The Copyright Dilemma Involving Online Service Providers: 
Problem Solved . . . For Now, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 823, 826 (1999) (dividing the broad definition of 
copyright infringement into three categories and giving an overview of how they have shaped copy-
right law). The ISP could be liable for the acts of the infringer even if they were unaware of and did 
not participate in the infringement because of the ISP’s ability to supervise the acts of the infringer on 
their own platform. Id. 
 120 Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000); Menell, supra note 39, 
at 137. Congress explicitly stated that they enacted the DMCA to further the development of the tech-
nology industry and improve the quality and variety of Internet services. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 2 
(1998). They also acknowledged that copyright owners might be disinclined to contribute content to 
the Internet without guarantees of protection against piracy. Id. at 8. 
 121 17 U.S.C. § 512 (code section containing the five safe harbors); Sag, supra note 24, at 503; 
Brandon Brown, Note, Fortifying the Safe Harbors: Reevaluating the DMCA in a Web 2.0 World, 23 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 437, 438 (2008). 
 122 Hillary A. Henderson, The Evolution of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act: Changing In-
terpretations of the DMCA and Future Implications for Digital Copyright Holders, 42 AIPLA Q.J. 
245, 255 (2014); Sag, supra note 24, at 511. The business model utilized by websites like YouTube, 
Facebook, and Instagram is coined “Web 2.0,” meaning they are built almost entirely on content pro-
duced and uploaded by users. Brown, supra note 121, at 437. 
 123 Sag, supra note 24, at 512. 
 124 Edward Lee, Decoding the DMCA Safe Harbors, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 233, 234 (2009). 
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harbor), with special requirements for each.125 If a website engages in multiple 
practices, it can qualify for all applicable safe harbors.126 
The initial requirements of the caching, storage, and search engine safe 
harbors are the same.127 The ISP must designate someone to whom copyright 
claims be addressed on their website and register them with the Copyright Of-
fice.128 The ISP also must adopt, publicize, and reasonably implement both a 
repeat infringer policy and a notice-and-takedown process.129 The notice-and-
takedown process consists of two parts.130 The first involves an ISP “expedi-
tiously” either removing or blocking access to the allegedly infringing content 
upon receipt of a DMCA-compliant notice of infringement.131 The second 
phase involves a set of procedures enumerated in the statute that gives users 
the opportunity to contest the takedown and have their content restored.132 
Should the ISP fail to meet these requirements, they are not automatically lia-
ble as a result of their user’s copyright infringement because ISPs may still use 
other copyright defenses such as fair use.133 
The flexible yet straightforward nature of the DMCA safe harbors provid-
ed vital protections to the modern Internet in its rapid growth period in the 
1990s, and they have since propelled the explosion of social networking sites 
                                                                                                                           
 125 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)–(d); Lee, supra note 124, at 235. The fifth safe harbor provides a limitation 
on liability for higher education institutions, so it is not relevant for ISPs. 17 U.S.C. § 512(e). 
 126 17 U.S.C. § 512(n); Lee, supra note 124, at 235. 
 127 17 U.S.C. § 512(b)–(d). The transmission safe harbor requires that the user initiate and select 
the transmitted material and the ISP must not modify the content. Id. § 512(a). The caching safe har-
bor additionally requires that the material be stored through an automated process as well as made 
available and transmitted by someone other than the ISP. Id. § 512(b). The storage and search engine 
safe harbors additionally require that the ISP not receive a financial benefit from the infringement 
when it has the ability to control the user’s activity in addition to having a lack of knowledge or 
awareness of the infringement or red flags. Id. § 512(c), (d). 
 128 Id. § 512(c)(2). 
 129 Id. § 512(c)(1)(C), (i)(1)(A). A repeat infringer policy must provide for termination of users 
that perpetrate copyright infringement more than once. Id. § 512(i)(1)(A). 
 130 Id. § 512(c). 
 131 Id. Some criticize this phase as an encroachment of First Amendment rights because the ISP 
must immediately take down the content without investigating the accuracy of the infringement claim 
in order to maintain safe harbor protection. Henderson, supra note 122, at 257–58; David Kravets, 10 
Years Later, Misunderstood DMCA Is the Law That Saved the Web, WIRED (Oct. 27, 2008), https://
www.wired.com/2008/10/ten-years-later/ [https://perma.cc/859F-4TCY]. In 2008, a high profile take-
down involved then-presidential candidate John McCain, whose team complained after the removal of 
some of his campaign videos using old news clips from YouTube. Kravets, supra. In a written re-
sponse to Senator McCain, YouTube attorney Zahavah Levine explained, “[w]ithout this safe harbor, 
sites like YouTube could not exist,” adding, “[w]e hope that as a content uploader, you have gained a 
sense of some of the challenges we face every day in operating YouTube.” Id. 
 132 17 U.S.C. § 512(g). 
 133 Henderson, supra note 122, at 257. 
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that would have otherwise been crushed under the weight of copyright litiga-
tion.134 
II. REGULATION D AND DMCA SAFE HARBORS: CONTROVERSIAL  
THOUGH ULTIMATELY PRO-COMPETITIVE 
Any regulation of cryptocurrencies is unlikely to achieve universal sup-
port as the controversy surrounding Regulation D and the DMCA safe harbors 
proves.135 Despite receiving criticism, however, both of these regulations rep-
resent successfully pro-competitive regulatory regimes of emerging areas that 
can be analogized to the growing cryptocurrency industry.136 Section A of this 
Part reviews the controversy surrounding the Regulation D clash with blue sky 
laws and subsequent allowance of general advertising and solicitation.137 Section 
B of this Part provides an explanation of the support and criticism over the inten-
tional vagueness in the drafting of the DMCA safe harbors.138 Section C of this 
Part explores the current arguments for and against cryptocurrency regulation.139 
A. Regulation D: Blue Sky Laws and General Solicitation Issues 
Supporters lauded—and critics harangued—Regulation D both before and 
after its inclusion in the amendments to the 2012 JOBS Act.140 Ultimately, the 
changes to the exemption addressed perceived shortcomings in the law, further 
contributing to the pro-competitive impact that the regulation had on the ven-
ture capital industry.141 
                                                                                                                           
 134 Sag, supra note 24, at 504–05; see Kravets, supra note 131 (“If you’re wondering whom to 
thank for the Web 2.0 explosion in interactive websites, consider sending a bouquet to Congress.”). 
 135 See Cohn & Yadley, supra note 90, at 4 (critiquing Regulation D for its lack of attention to the 
plight of small businesses raising capital); Lee, supra note 124, at 262 (critiquing the DMCA safe 
harbors for potentially offering a misleading promise of legal immunity to ISPs); Thompson & 
Langevoort, supra note 39, at 1619 (expressing understanding regarding the removal of a ban on gen-
eral advertising in Regulation D but suggesting other changes). 
 136 See Alexis A. Geeza, Comment, Put Your Money Where Your Mind Is: Protecting the Markets 
in the Age of Post-JOBS Act Rule 506 Offerings, 45 SETON HALL L. REV. 581, 587 (2015) (noting that 
allowing general solicitation and advertising has the pro-competitive impact of encouraging securities 
issuers to compete for potential investors); Kravets, supra note 131 (attributing the explosion of the 
modern Internet to the passage of the DMCA). 
 137 See infra notes 140–163 and accompanying text. 
 138 See infra notes 164–180 and accompanying text. 
 139 See infra notes 181–189 and accompanying text. 
 140 See Cohn & Yadley, supra note 90, at 4 (critiquing the SEC’s lack of attention towards the 
trials of small businesses in raising capital); Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 39, at 1619 (ex-
pressing sympathy for the logic of removing a ban on general advertising but positing different chang-
es that Congress should make to the regulation); Manning Gilbert Warren III, The False Promise of 
Publicly Offered Private Placements, 68 SMU L. REV. 899, 911 (2015) (arguing that the new Rule 
506(c) exemption did not significantly change the way that capital is raised). 
 141 See KEVIN A. HASSETT & ROBERT J. SHAPIRO, REGULATION AND INVESTMENT: A NOTE ON 
POLICY EVALUATION UNDER UNCERTAINTY, WITH AN APPLICATION TO FCC TITLE II REGULATION OF 
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Even before the 2012 JOBS Act, regulators revised Regulation D to deal 
with perceived challenges to capital raising from state blue sky laws with 
NSMIA in 1996.142 The passage of NSMIA eliminated the cumbersome state 
registration requirements for thousands of issuers, contributing to the increased 
flow of investment over the past twenty years.143 Critics still lament the lack of 
coordination between federal and state authorities and its harmful effects on 
small business growth, similar to the criticism that has been mounted against 
the disjointed state and federal cryptocurrency regulations.144 Others argue that 
the Rule 506 exemption from state blue sky laws does not go far enough be-
cause the other exemptions are still subject to blue sky law registration provi-
sions, which limit the ability of small businesses to raise capital.145 The itera-
tive passage of NSMIA, however, undoubtedly increased the overall efficiency 
of the regulatory scheme by lowering the transaction costs of raising capital.146 
One of the most controversial JOBS Act changes to Rule 506 is the al-
lowance of solicitation and advertising under Rule 506(c).147 Academic and 
political support for the change was strong because of the seemingly contradic-
tory nature of the rule prior to the change.148 Because accredited investors are 
presumed to be sophisticated enough to manage their investments without leg-
islative protection, it seemed to be antithetical for the SEC to prohibit issuers 
                                                                                                                           
THE INTERNET 4 (2015), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/f72b/a5de23329f5a81aca04f1d59c41a549445
8f.pdf?_ga=2.257317576.257878755.1581987307-1432409253.1581987307 [https://perma.cc/C8WK-
V4N7] (describing the process by which regulators propose new rules to solve problems associated 
with old regulations). In other cases, regulators may propose rules so different from the current rule 
that opponents lack any evidence to cite in order to oppose the change. Id. 
 142 Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (1996); Sjostrom, supra note 96, at 1152. 
 143 See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Role of Blue Sky Laws After NSMIA and the JOBS Act, 66 
DUKE L.J. 605, 620 (2016) (discussing the importance of the National Securities Markets Improvement 
Act of 1996 (NSMIA) and its preemptive effects on state authority over Regulation D offerings). 
 144 See, e.g., Cohn & Yadley, supra note 90, at 13; Alkadri, supra note 70, at 89 (arguing that 
both cryptocurrency businesses and federal regulators are impacted by the disparities in state regula-
tions). When a company is considering where to conduct the capital-raising process, the necessity of 
investigating state qualifications adds time and costs that may outweigh the benefits of conducting a 
small private offering in that state. Cohn & Yadley, supra note 90, at 13. Regulators have also ex-
pressed concern that the patchwork of overlapping state regulations contributes to a lack of transpar-
ency and may negatively affect consumer protection. Alkadri, supra note 70, at 89. 
 145 Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Wreck of Regulation D: The Unintended (and Bad) Outcomes 
for the SEC’s Crown Jewel Exemptions, 66 BUS. LAW. 919, 933 (2011). 
 146 Campbell, supra note 143, at 628. 
 147 See 17 C.F.R § 230.502(c) (2017) (allowing general solicitation and advertising in § 230.506(c)); 
Cohn & Yadley, supra note 90, at 36 (arguing that the greatest detriment to capital raising by small com-
panies was the ban on general solicitation and advertising). Due to the change in the Rule 506(c) exemp-
tion, issuers can solicit advertisers and market their securities through many different media including 
Facebook, billboards, television ads, radio, or solicitation letters. Campbell, supra note 98, at 30; Warren, 
supra note 140, at 900–01. 
 148 Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 39, at 1615. 
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from directly seeking these investors through marketing.149 The SEC’s as-
sumption that some non-accredited investors would be vulnerable to fraud as a 
result of an issuer’s publicity campaign seemed overblown, especially in tan-
dem with the requirements for issuers to take reasonable steps to ensure that 
only accredited investors are part of the offering.150 Additionally, advance-
ments in modern communications technologies increased awareness about the 
need for change in securities regulation.151 Much as regulators struggle to keep 
up with the rapid advancements in financial technology, securities regulation 
has been slow to adapt to the innovative ways in which issuers and potential 
investors now communicate.152 
Critics of the regulatory change strongly cautioned against allowing gen-
eral solicitation due to the potential for abuse.153 In 2011, the SEC, in conjunc-
tion with state regulators, filed over three hundred disciplinary actions related 
to Rule 506 offerings, demonstrating its potential for fraudulent activities even 
before the allowance of general solicitation.154 While acknowledging the po-
tential benefit to startups and small businesses seeking funding, detractors ar-
gue that it would be naïve to expect fraudulent promoters not to utilize general 
advertising for harmful purposes, especially with vulnerable groups like 
wealthy senior citizens who would in fact qualify as accredited investors under 
the rule.155 Should Rule 506(c) solicitation and advertising become synony-
                                                                                                                           
 149 Id.; see Cohn & Yadley, supra note 90, at 42 (asking why an issuer must have a prior relation-
ship with a potential investor if that investor is able to evaluate the investment and has been given 
sufficient information about it). 
 150 Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 39, at 1615. 
 151 Cohn & Yadley, supra note 90, at 6. The Internet now provides potential investors nearly 
instantaneous, unlimited information regarding investments and gives issuers the ability to communi-
cate their value to many different audiences. Id. 
 152 TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 308; Cohn & Yadley, supra note 90, at 6. 
 153 See, e.g., Public Statement, Comm’r Luis A. Aguilar, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Investor Protec-
tion is Needed for True Capital Formation: Views on the JOBS Act (Mar. 16, 2012), https://www.sec.
gov/news/public-statement/2012-spch031612laahtm [https://perma.cc/X7WY-HB2E] (stating concern 
that the provision “would be a boon to boiler room operators, Ponzi schemers, bucket shops, and gar-
den variety fraudsters, by enabling them to cast a wider net, and making securities law enforcement 
much more difficult”). 
 154 See Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address at the North American Securi-
ties Administrators Association, Annual NASSA/SEC 19(d) Conference, Washington, D.C.: Out-
manned and Outgunned: Fighting on Behalf of Investors Despite Efforts to Weaken Investor Protec-
tions (Apr. 16, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2013-spch041613laahtm [https://perma.cc/
WW7M-SL4G] (discussing the concern that the potential allowance of general solicitation would 
subject potential investors to a higher risk of fraud than the existing rule). 
 155 See Dravis, supra note 24, at 307 (positing that it would be naïve to expect fraudsters not to 
“fish in the broader pond of potential victims”); Geeza, supra note 136, at 599 (calling out wealthy 
senior citizens as a representative group of people that may be considered accredited investors under 
the statute but are not necessarily sophisticated in their investment strategies). 
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mous with fraud, it could have the detrimental effect of discouraging invest-
ment in startups and small businesses.156 
In reality, the changes to Rule 506(c) did not dramatically change the 
methods that issuers use to raise capital.157 The great majority of issuers still 
choose to use the Rule 506(b) filing.158 Among other reasons for this, startup 
founders or small business owners already have adequate capital available to 
them without general solicitation and lawyers are more familiar with Rule 
506(b).159 Former SEC Chairman Mary Jo White admitted in 2016 that the 
agency had not observed any prevalent fraud in the market as many had 
warned would occur.160 Overall, the amendment resulted in even more choices 
for potential issuers and likely improved the public understanding of private 
placement investment options.161 Additionally, more frequent and public solici-
tations in the marketplace as a result of the regulatory amendment serve to in-
crease competition between emerging companies by forcing them to develop 
new strategies to attract investors.162 Regulators ultimately recognized the detri-
mental effects of both overlapping blue sky laws and the ban on general solicita-
tion—successfully amending Regulation D over time to meet modern needs.163 
B. Ambiguity in the DMCA Safe Harbors 
Because Congress intentionally drafted the DMCA safe harbors to be 
flexible in nature, they have engendered a fair amount of litigation.164 Despite 
                                                                                                                           
 156 Dravis, supra note 24, at 307. 
 157 Warren, supra note 140, at 902–03. 
 158 Id. During the first eighteen months of the new exemption, Rule 506(c) accounted for only 
7.71% of filings under Rule 506. Id. at 903. 
 159 Id. at 905–06. Other relevant factors include a hesitancy to allow accredited strangers to invest 
rather than known parties, uncertainties regarding the requirement to verify third parties, and a desire 
to circumvent the increased regulatory scrutiny that the SEC promised to adhere to with Rule 506(c) 
offerings. Id. at 906. 
 160 See Melanie Waddell, SEC Has ‘Open Investigations’ of Private Offerings to Accredited In-
vestors, THINKADVISOR (Feb. 10, 2016), https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2016/02/10/sec-has-open-
investigations-of-private-offerings-t/ [https://perma.cc/6KXC-BJLK] (quoting Chairman White ad-
dressing the general solicitation allowance and stating that any market will perpetuate some sort of 
fraud, but there is no evidence of pervasive fraud in the securities market).  
 161 See Geeza, supra note 136, at 587–88 (describing the justifications for removing the ban on 
general advertising and solicitation). With the increased prevalence of commercials and media adver-
tising securities offerings, it is likely that more people will consider private placements as a viable 
financial strategy. Id. 
 162 Id. at 587. 
 163 Pub. L. No 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (1996); 17 C.F.R § 230.506(c) (2013); see Campbell, 
supra note 143, at 620 (discussing the value of the passage of NSMIA for preempting state blue sky 
laws); Geeza, supra note 136, at 588 (discussing the modern reality that marketing is a key business 
necessity that justifies the allowance of general advertising and solicitation). 
 164 See Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 315, 329 (2013) 
(elucidating the various lawsuits that the DMCA spurred, including those regarding the eligibility of 
certain companies for safe harbor protections); see also S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 2 (1998) (noting that 
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the consequential efforts by courts to drill down the standards over the past 
twenty years, statutory vagueness allows the safe harbors to remain applicable 
in a radically different technological era.165 
Critics of the statutory vagueness argue that, instead of promoting the de-
velopment of innovative technology, disputes over the language have clogged 
federal courts with expensive litigation and made the safe harbors less clear.166 
This is directly contrary to the original goal of safe harbor provisions, which 
was to provide “greater certainty” to ISPs.167 At best, critics argue, an ambigu-
ous safe harbor is not useful because it provides no guidance for liability 
avoidance and, at worst, it can act as a false promise of immunity.168 
For example, courts dispute the degree to which an ISP must have 
knowledge of infringement before it loses safe harbor protection.169 The two 
most influential federal circuit courts in the technology sphere, the Second and 
Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals, differ on the issue, with the Ninth Circuit giv-
ing broad protection to ISPs and the Second Circuit narrowing the circum-
stances under which the safe harbor applies.170 Unsurprisingly, ISPs and copy-
                                                                                                                           
the DMCA was enacted purposefully so that “the efficiency of the Internet will continue to improve 
and that the variety and quality of services on the Internet will expand”); Blevins, supra note 118, at 
1879 (noting that the DMCA is “not a model of textual clarity”).  
 165 Emilio Nicolas & Jackson Walker, So Far, So Good? The DMCA Safe Harbors at Twenty, JD 
SUPRA (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/so-far-so-good-the-dmca-safe-harbors-at-
61844/ [https://perma.cc/W5DG-B4AX]; see Sag, supra note 24, at 506 (noting the technological 
advancement since 1998, supported by the fact that only 41% of households in the United States had 
an Internet connection at the time of the DMCA passage). 
 166 Jessica Di Palma, Note, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act and the Clash Between Authors 
and Innovators: The Need for a Legislative Amendment to the Safe Harbor Provisions, 47 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 797, 823 (2014); see Mark A. Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors, 6 J. TELECOMM. & 
HIGH TECH. L. 101, 102 (2007) (calling the safe harbors “a confusing and illogical patchwork”). 
 167 Blevins, supra note 118, at 1879; see S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 20 (1998) (stating that the safe 
harbors provide service providers assurance regarding the potential legal ramifications of infringement 
perpetuated on their platforms). 
 168 Lee, supra note 124, at 262. When businesses invest resources in developing a business model 
based on the assumption of immunity, it can be disastrous when that assumption turns out to be false. 
Id. 
 169 See Susanna Monseau, Fostering Web 2.0 Innovation: The Role of the Judicial Interpretation 
of the DMCA Safe Harbor, Secondary Liability, and Fair Use, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 
70, 85 (2012) (stating that it is unclear to ISPs what kind of knowledge and type of activity would strip 
them of safe harbor protection). The so-called “red-flag theory” has been advanced by copyright hold-
ers arguing that ISPs have sufficient awareness of infringement when there has been other infringing 
activity on their platforms. Lee, supra note 124, at 251. 
 170 See Di Palma, supra note 166, at 813–22 (detailing the diverging opinions regarding the safe 
harbor provisions in the Second Circuit and Ninth Circuit). Compare UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter 
Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1022–23 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that simply hosting copy-
rightable content, understanding that their platforms could be hosting infringing material, and failing 
to locate infringing materials that they are unaware of will not cause ISPs to lose safe harbor protec-
tion), with Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 32 (2d. Cir. 2012) (holding that ISPs are 
disqualified from the safe harbor protection if they have actual knowledge of circumstances that indi-
cate infringement). 
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right owners also hold different views about court interpretation of the stat-
utes.171 ISPs prefer interpretations that create bright-line rules to reduce com-
pliance costs and increase predictability, whereas copyright owners prefer un-
specific, fact-intensive interpretations that broaden the doctrine and increase 
their chances of a win in court proceedings.172 Either way, the multitude of 
court decisions and various factors added upon each iteration have complicated 
the issue and made the safe harbor protections less predictable and more ex-
pensive to litigate.173 
Still other critics argue that the statute was not drafted to keep apace with 
future technological change.174 The DMCA was passed before social network-
ing sites became a daily part of life, so the intricacies of that business model 
are not reflected in the text.175 They argue that, contrary to the DMCA’s goal 
of flexibility, as new technologies and business models emerge, the enumerat-
ed safe harbor categories of the DMCA may become obsolete.176 This trend 
would echo the many securities regulations that struggle to adapt to the use of 
rapid communications technologies by investors and cryptocurrency develop-
ing faster than regulators can pass laws.177 
Congress intentionally drafted the statute to allow courts to shape it in 
tandem with the Internet’s own development, which is the reason that the safe 
harbors have remained so vitally important to the success of companies like 
Google, which was founded shortly before passage of the DMCA.178 With ap-
                                                                                                                           
 171 Blevins, supra note 118, at 1824–25. 
 172 Id. The uncertain statutes serve to benefit copyright owners alleging infringement because they 
often generate fact-intensive questions, pushing ISPs to settle quickly to avoid the costs of litigation. 
Id. at 1829–30. Copyright violations are also known for high and unpredictable monetary damages, 
running up to $150,000 per infringement, that help explain ISP skittishness about potential litigation. 
Id. at 1832. 
 173 Eric Goldman, Viacom Loses Again—Viacom v. YouTube, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (Apr. 19, 
2013), https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2013/04/viacom_loses_ag.htm [https://perma.cc/7QV5-
4K4E] (using Viacom as an illustrative example of a lawsuit that has added additional unnecessary 
layers of common law interpretation to the safe harbors, thereby creating uncertainty and added ex-
penses for all future suits). 
 174 See Lemley, supra note 166, at 113 (arguing that the safe harbors became obsolete with the 
rise of peer-to-peer networking and will continue to lose relevance as other new technologies are de-
veloped). 
 175 Monseau, supra note 169, at 84. Napster, the earliest known file-sharing website, was invented 
seven months post-DMCA enactment. Id. 
 176 Id. at 75. 
 177 Cohn & Yadley, supra note 90, at 6; see TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 308 (argu-
ing that technologically disruptive innovations like cryptocurrency are moving so quickly that it is 
often difficult for government institutions to fully comprehend or regulate them). There seems to be a 
consensus among the general public and legal commentators that intellectual property law specifically 
has struggled to adapt in the face of new technology. Monseau, supra note 169, at 75. 
 178 Brown, supra note 121, at 444; see H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, at 61 (1998) (explaining that Con-
gress “believes that technology is likely to be the solution to many of the issues facing copyright own-
ers and service providers in this digital age”); Sag, supra note 24, at 506 (noting the founding of 
Google on September 4, 1998, which was two months before the passage of the DMCA).  
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propriate judicial tailoring, the safe harbors have evolved to meet new techno-
logical needs and remain relevant in modern cases.179 As with Regulation D, 
twenty years of use in the field has exposed aspects of the statute that could be 
adapted and improved upon, but it is up to Congress to either amend the statute 
or continue to leave its interpretation to divided courts.180 
C. Cryptocurrencies: Regulate Them, Let Them Be,  
or Somewhere in Between? 
Reactions among scholars and commentators regarding cryptocurrency 
regulations range from urging caution to encouraging immediate regulatory 
guidance.181 Some warn that quickly introducing regulations without a com-
prehensive understanding of cryptocurrency, its implications, and its potential 
evolution would harm the development of the industry, and recommend pass-
ing legislation with great precaution.182 In the same vein, criticism surrounds 
the existing patchwork of state cryptocurrency guidance.183 Similar to issues 
with state blue sky laws and Regulation D, the mess of state regulations nega-
tively affects both innovators and federal regulators.184 Regulation passed too 
early in the development of a fledgling industry can stunt innovation or cause 
innovators to move to illegitimate channels to avoid oversight, which reduces 
                                                                                                                           
 179 Henderson, supra note 122, at 247. 
 180 Nicolas & Walker, supra note 165. 
 181 Compare TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 264 (encouraging a balanced approach to 
cryptocurrency regulation), with Chuang, supra note 64 (quoting an investor who believes, “[i]t’s 
better to have clear guidelines, even if they are bad guidelines because entrepreneurs can understand 
that better than the current environment of ambiguity”). 
 182 See TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 263 (arguing that if regulators do not understand 
a technology or its implications, they will fail at regulating effectively); Goforth, supra note 16, at 107 
(noting that CFTC and SEC regulators have cautioned Congress about the necessity of balancing 
flourishing innovation and legitimate regulatory needs); Primavera de Filippi, We Must Regulate 
Bitcoin. Problem Is, We Don’t Understand It, WIRED (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/03/
must-understand-bitcoin-regulate/ [https://perma.cc/2TCY-88MV] (advocating for cryptocurrency 
regulation to be “elaborated carefully and in a well-informed manner” so as not to prematurely stifle 
future technological growth). 
 183 See Cohn & Yadley, supra note 90, at 13 (criticizing the uncertainty and costliness of review-
ing state law in the capital-raising process); Alkadri, supra note 70, at 89 (arguing that the inconsistent 
state regulations negatively affect cryptocurrency businesses, federal regulators, and consumers); 
Stankovic, supra note 27 (calling out legislative uncertainty, partly as a result of divergent state ap-
proaches to cryptocurrency, as an important risk factor in the cryptocurrency industry). 
 184 See Cohn & Yadley, supra note 90, at 13 (arguing that the need to abide by state laws adds 
unnecessary time and cost to capital-raising and may deter prospective securities issuers altogether); 
Alkadri, supra note 70, at 89 (stating that federal regulators are concerned that inconsistent state regu-
lations create barriers to consumer transparency and protections); Stankovic, supra note 27 (calling 
out issues with the legislative uncertainty created by dissimilar cryptocurrency regulations). States 
have been criticized for the reactive nature of their regulatory schemes, implemented in response to 
arbitrary news crises rather than in pursuit of long-term goals. Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 53, 
at 498–99. 
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competitiveness—and subsequent technological development—within the le-
gitimate industry.185 
A suggested middle-ground approach welcomes cryptocurrency and 
works with innovators to devise uniform regulations that satisfy all parties.186 
One commentator argues that cryptocurrencies will not be able to reach their 
full potential or be considered mainstream until they are regulated by law.187 
Cryptocurrency entrepreneurs and investors have also continuously warned 
that the lack of regulation in the United States is causing capital to be sent 
overseas where regulatory certainty is greater.188 Members of Congress have 
echoed this sentiment by asking the SEC to clarify its position on the status of 
various digital tokens as securities for fear that cryptocurrency entrepreneurs 
may be heading overseas.189 
III. CRYPTOCURRENCY REGULATIONS: PRECARIOUS BUT NECESSARY 
The lack of clear cryptocurrency regulatory guidance is harmful to both 
innovators and investors.190 Furthermore, cryptocurrency needs a stable regula-
tory environment to become a viable new technology.191 The successes and 
                                                                                                                           
 185 Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 53, at 499–500; see Tim Worstall, It Could Be the Bu-
reaucrats That Kill Bitcoin, FORBES (May 16, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2013/
05/16/it-could-be-the-bureaucrats-that-kill-bitcoin/#681e42497002 [https://perma.cc/SZ59-9MSX] 
(arguing that, because of Bitcoin’s recent popularity, regulatory requirements that are a function of the 
global financial system will “strangle” its growth prematurely). 
 186 See TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 292 (praising the CANADIAN SENATE REPORT 
that incorporated suggestions from a variety of blockchain stakeholders and suggested that govern-
ments should welcome cryptocurrency); Jon Martindale, Go Ahead, Pass Laws. They Can’t Kill 
Bitcoin, Even if They Try, DIG. TRENDS (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/
dont-worry-about-bitcoin-regulation-it-cant-be-stopped/ [https://perma.cc/PK3J-JX5J] (“Ultimately, 
the best response to bitcoin is not to limit it, but to embrace the technology and try and work with it.”). 
 187 de Filippi, supra note 54, at 9–10. de Filippi argues that cryptocurrency has already proven 
itself sustainable and economically viable, so its survival will depend on its ability to operate in a 
regulated system and gain public trust. Id. at 5, 10. Hughes and Middlebrook similarly argue that 
regulation can signal legitimacy to financial heavyweights, like banks and investors, with the capacity 
to raise capital and push products to the market. Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 53, at 499. 
 188 See Jon Russell, The US Is Losing Out to the Rest of the World on Blockchain, Warn Crypto 
Figures, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 5, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/09/05/the-us-is-losing-out-to-the-
rest-of-the-world-on-blockchain-warn-major-crypto-figures/ [https://perma.cc/3EUB-44LW] (quoting 
two cryptocurrency entrepreneurs that over 80% of their investments in token and blockchain compa-
nies are overseas because entrepreneurs feel more secure in starting cryptocurrency companies outside 
of the United States). 
 189 Kate Rooney, Congress Members Ask SEC Chairman for Clarity on Cryptocurrency Regulation, 
CNBC (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/28/congress-ask-sec-chairman-for-clarity-on-
cryptocurrency-regulation.html [https://perma.cc/42AY-Z3ZK]. 
 190 Brennan et al., supra note 19, at 14 (stating that the excitement over cryptocurrency and the 
concurrent lack of a clear regulatory scheme may cause investors to lose sight of reality and develop-
ers to behave recklessly). 
 191 See Sonderegger, supra note 11, at 216 (arguing that the success of cryptocurrency depends on 
proper regulation that does not stifle entrepreneurship); Obie & Rasmussen, supra note 19 (stating that 
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criticisms of Regulation D and the DMCA safe harbor provisions illustrate the 
type of regulation that the industry needs: clear and definitive, but flexible and 
iterative.192 
Section A of this Part posits that the regulatory agencies must work to-
gether to achieve a uniform cryptocurrency regulatory scheme and must exer-
cise caution in enacting regulations.193 Section B of this Part argues that the 
iterative process surrounding the passage of Regulation D and its subsequent 
amendments serves as a model for future cryptocurrency regulations.194 Sec-
tion C of this Part argues that the vagueness of the DMCA safe harbors offers a 
good example of successful regulatory drafting for cryptocurrency.195 
A. General Approach: Determining the Lead Regulator  
and Exercising Caution 
The current overlapping system of federal regulations is confusing and 
precarious for cryptocurrency entrepreneurs and investors alike.196 Before it 
can be determined how to regulate cryptocurrency, it must be determined who 
should regulate it.197 Whether cryptocurrency is a security, a currency, a prop-
erty, or a commodity must be clarified at a federal level as the first step in de-
termining regulatory authority and removing barriers to entry for entrepre-
neurs.198 Congress seems to think the SEC should lead the charge, but regard-
less of which agency prevails, there must be a general federal consensus that 
one regulatory agency will implement and enforce a uniform scheme of cryp-
tocurrency regulations.199 
                                                                                                                           
the lack of a single regulatory agency with authority to oversee cryptocurrency is causing confusion 
and uncertainty). 
 192 See Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 39, at 1615 (praising the elimination of Regulation 
D’s ban on general solicitation that resulted from a long-fought popular campaign); Di Palma, supra 
note 166, at 823 (arguing that the vagueness of the DMCA safe harbors has only created confusion for 
ISPs and copyright owners). 
 193 See infra notes 196–204 and accompanying text. 
 194 See infra notes 205–214 and accompanying text. 
 195 See infra notes 215–225 and accompanying text. 
 196 See Goforth, supra note 16, at 103 (describing the overlapping and confusing collection of 
regulations surrounding cryptocurrency); Obie & Rasmussen, supra note 19 (arguing that entrepre-
neurs refrain from innovating for fear of accidentally breaking the law and investors refrain from 
investing due to uncertainty in the cryptocurrency industry). 
 197 See Stankovic, supra note 27 (describing the divergent approaches to cryptocurrency among 
states and various regulatory agencies). Regulatory uncertainty has been called out as the most im-
portant risk factor in the cryptocurrency industry. Id. 
 198 See Goforth, supra note 16, at 103 (stating that cryptocurrency is defined as a currency, com-
modity, security, or property depending on the agency); Obie & Rasmussen, supra note 19 (arguing 
that overlapping regulations from federal agencies makes cryptocurrency innovation expensive). 
 199 See Obie & Rasmussen, supra note 19 (making suggestions for the SEC to clarify cryptocur-
rency regulations and noting that the overlapping federal agency regulations are harmful to innova-
tion); Rooney, supra note 83 (elaborating on the SEC’s current position on cryptocurrency); Rooney, 
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Regulators must exercise caution because, although regulations are neces-
sary, they could be anti-competitive if executed incorrectly.200 An excessive 
regime of cryptocurrency regulations stunt innovation, economic efficiency, 
and investment; moreover, it could endanger the effectiveness of the rule of 
law.201 For many innovators, the simple threat of regulatory scrutiny over their 
activities, and in turn potential penalties, is enough for them to pause or termi-
nate their work or refuse to enter the market altogether.202 Cryptocurrency of-
fers a break-through alternative to traditional banking because it allows indi-
viduals to transfer digital property in a frictionless, instant, and secure way.203 
Because of the countless societal benefits that these types of secure transfers 
offer, the government must regulate carefully to avoid deterring entrepreneurs 
from entering the space.204 
B. Regulation D: A Model for an Iterative Process and  
State Blue Sky Law Issues 
Although Regulation D has its fair share of critics, it represents a positive 
example of regulators iterating laws over time to adjust to modern technologi-
cal advancements.205 As modern communications technologies made it easier 
for issuers to contact potential investors, regulators adjusted Rule 506(c) to 
allow general solicitation and advertising.206 This sort of iterative feature will 
likely be necessary in any cryptocurrency regulation given the speed at which 
the technology is evolving.207 
                                                                                                                           
supra note 189 (summarizing a letter sent by members of Congress to the SEC urging the agency to 
clarify cryptocurrency regulations). 
 200 OECD REPORT, supra note 12, at 14. 
 201 See id. (stating that unnecessary and cumbersome regulations can be harmful to economic 
growth and challenge the positive justifications of a regulatory scheme). 
 202 Torrance & von Hippel, supra note 13, at 798. An enforcement action for a small startup or 
business could be financially devastating, especially when compared to the seemingly unlimited mon-
etary and administrative resources of government agencies. Id. 
 203 See TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 6 (describing the benefits of cryptocurrency, 
including its distributed, encrypted, and public nature); Andreessen, supra note 1 (extolling the virtues 
of Bitcoin as a computer science breakthrough). 
 204 TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 264; see Andreessen, supra note 1 (claiming that the 
benefits of the creation of cryptocurrency are hard to overstate). 
 205 See, e.g., Cohn & Yadley, supra note 90, at 6–7 (criticizing the Regulation D exemption up-
dates for only benefitting large companies and failing to fully address technological advancements); 
see HASSETT & SHAPIRO, supra note 141, at 4 (attributing regulatory discrepancies to attempts by 
regulators to draft new laws that neutralize unpopular regulations of the past). 
 206 See Cohn & Yadley, supra note 90, at 6 (describing the modern technological advancements 
that increased the amount of information available to issuers and speed with which it can be commu-
nicated to investors). 
 207 See HASSETT & SHAPIRO, supra note 141, at 4 (describing the effect of regulators identifying 
harmful or unpopular regulations and proposing new laws to address the issues); Emerging Tech. from 
the arXiv, supra note 52 (stating that the market for cryptocurrency is in a period of aggressive 
growth). Some argue that the cryptocurrency craze is analogous to the dot-com bubble due to the rapid 
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Much as Regulation D was adjusted to meet modern needs, regulators 
must be vigilant and continue to educate themselves about the advancements in 
the cryptocurrency industry so that regulations continue to be applicable and 
relevant.208 Existing regulations used to monitor the financial and investment 
industry are ill-suited for cryptocurrency, so an adaptable process will be nec-
essary to allow regulators to regularly assess the suitability of the regulatory 
framework as new technologies evolve.209 Involving collaborative representa-
tives from the cryptocurrency community in this process is the best course of 
action to create favorable regulations for all parties involved.210 
The passage of NSMIA to preempt state blue sky laws clashing with Reg-
ulation D serves as a pertinent example of regulators revising laws over time to 
address problems as they arise.211 Regulators recognized the burdensome effect 
of overlapping state blue sky laws on entrepreneurs, and federal preemption 
provided a beneficial solution.212 The cryptocurrency sphere is similarly suffer-
ing from a lack of coordination between states and the federal government; it 
could greatly benefit from federal preemption.213 Cryptocurrency companies 
are intrinsically Internet-based endeavors, and the financial burden of obtain-
ing operating licenses and maintaining compliance on a state-by-state basis is 
not necessarily feasible.214 
                                                                                                                           
growth of both industries and similar sky-high valuations. Bryanov, supra note 41. A much broader 
range of actors, however, constitute cryptocurrency investors than were involved in the dot-com ven-
ture capital craze. Id. These actors are also considerably more well-informed about market conditions 
due to technological advancements that increase the transparency of the information market surround-
ing cryptocurrency. Id. 
 208 See Brennan et al., supra note 19, at 14 (extolling the benefits of continued education about 
cryptocurrency regulations). 
 209 See CANADIAN SENATE REPORT, supra note 53, at 17 (providing a positive example of regula-
tory awareness by stating the Committee’s intention to revisit cryptocurrencies in a few years to learn 
more about the advancements in the technology and make new recommendations based on those find-
ings); Tu & Meredith, supra note 1, at 274–75 (describing the difficulties encountered in trying to fit 
cryptocurrency into existing regulatory schemes). The regulatory framework for financial services in 
almost every country was not built in anticipation of cryptocurrencies. Andreessen, supra note 1. 
Cryptocurrencies have a risk profile, due to their virtual nature, that does not match the risk profile of 
traditional financial institutions or the regulations that surround them. Tu & Meredith, supra note 1, at 
274–75. 
 210 See TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 297 (advocating for the government to regulate 
cautiously and collaboratively in a process involving multiple stakeholders); Obie & Rasmussen, 
supra note 19 (suggesting that the SEC create a working group with multiple regulatory agencies and 
cryptocurrency community representatives to help clarify and formalize cryptocurrency regulations). 
 211 Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (1996). 
 212 See Cohn & Yadley, supra note 90, at 13 (describing the ways in which state blue sky laws 
impede capital-raising); Sjostrom, supra note 96, at 1152 (describing overlapping state blue sky laws 
as burdensome for potential issuers). 
 213 Stankovic, supra note 27; see Shin, supra note 17 (describing the current cryptocurrency regu-
lation as a turf war between the federal government, state governments, and regulatory agencies that is 
harmful to innovation and growth). 
 214 Goforth, supra note 16, at 104; Alkadri, supra note 70, at 89. 
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C. DMCA Safe Harbors: Demonstrated Necessity for Clarity and Flexibility 
The DMCA safe harbors provide an example of regulations drafted with 
intentional vagueness to allow them to grow with the technological advance-
ments of their subject matter.215 Because the safe harbors contain broad lan-
guage but encompass a specific set of ISP conduct, they have remained appli-
cable to ISPs today even though twenty years have passed since the inception 
of the DMCA.216 Any future cryptocurrency regulations must also strike a fine 
line between ambiguity and specificity.217 Ambiguity enables regulatory appli-
cation in many different situations, and specificity renders regulations immedi-
ately useful rather than leaving them to the courts for interpretation.218 
Because of cryptocurrency’s ideological underpinnings as a safer, quick-
er, and cheaper alternative to traditional payments systems, it requires a degree 
of regulatory independence that will encourage innovation while providing 
some necessary guidance.219 The challenge is to transform rules designed for 
old technology, so that they are familiar enough to be immediately useful but 
also able to keep up with cryptocurrency as it rapidly evolves.220 One commen-
tator has even stated that cryptocurrency needs regulations that are similar to 
the technology itself: “humble, experimental, and iterative.”221 
Regulators must be careful with the degree of ambiguity, however, be-
cause a new regulation can be especially harmful if it incentivizes investors to 
wait to invest due to uncertainty.222 If a regulation is likely to perpetuate a 
drawn-out and expensive court battle with no immediately clear outcome, it is 
likely to temper investor enthusiasm.223 For example, copyright violations have 
unpredictable monetary damages—up to $150,000 per infringement—and the 
DMCA safe harbors have not excelled at reducing this uncertainty for ISPs, 
                                                                                                                           
 215 See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 2 (1998) (noting that the DMCA was enacted purposefully so that 
the Internet will continue to grow in efficiency and the services offered will grow in both number and 
quality). 
 216 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)–(d) (2018) (ratification of the DMCA safe harbors); Henderson, supra 
note 122, at 246–47 (describing the DMCA as the bedrock of federal digital copyright law and attrib-
uting its modern applicability to built-in ambiguities). 
 217 Sonderegger, supra note 11, at 216; see Brennan et al., supra note 19, at 14 (comparing the 
regulatory uncertainty to a foggy road and advocating for a conservative approach similar to driving 
cautiously when it is hard to see the road ahead). 
 218 See Sonderegger, supra note 11, at 216 (arguing for vaguely-defined cryptocurrency regula-
tions that allow for self-regulation). 
 219 See id. (arguing that the disruptive effects of cryptocurrency shake the regulatory foundation 
that traditional financial systems rely upon); Andreessen, supra note 1 (describing Bitcoin as a way to 
transfer digital property in a safe, secure, public, and legitimate manner). 
 220 TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 264. 
 221 Id. at 293. 
 222 See HASSETT & SHAPIRO, supra note 141, at 9 (positing that regulation can negatively affect 
investment activity if its impacts on business are indeterminate). 
 223 Id. 
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wasting both judicial time and ISP resources with costly litigation.224 The 
meaning of some of the safe harbors are still disputed, so ideally cryptocurren-
cy regulations would be less statutorily vague but still allow for innovation and 
encourage investment.225 
CONCLUSION 
Since 2009, the popularity of cryptocurrency has grown immensely. As it 
has moved to the forefront of public awareness, it is unsurprising that regula-
tors desire to regulate it. The current regulatory environment in the United 
States, however, is characterized by a chaotic puzzle of regulations and defini-
tions from multiple regulatory agencies. Venture capitalists and entrepreneurs 
alike are hesitant to set up shop in the United States when it comes to crypto-
currency; both companies and capital have flocked to other countries with 
more stable (and friendly) cryptocurrency regulatory environments. Regulation 
D and the DMCA safe harbors represent examples of regulations that had a 
positive impact on their respective industries by providing certainty to innova-
tors and removing market barriers. Regulation D eased the burdens on small 
emerging companies for raising capital through an iterative process, stimulat-
ing the explosion of dot-com companies in the 1990s. With the rapid growth of 
cryptocurrency, any regulations put into practice should allow for a similar 
process and regulators must be just as flexible, if not more, in adjusting the 
regulations over time. Regulators intentionally drafted the DMCA safe harbors 
vaguely to allow the statute to grow in tandem with the evolution of ISPs and 
the Internet. Cryptocurrency regulations should be drafted similarly to keep up 
with virtual currency’s rapid evolution. Regulators must strike a fine balance; 
beneficial cryptocurrency regulations will contain both the ambiguity to be 
applicable across a variety of situations and the specificity to create clear 
guidelines and stability for innovators and investors. 
AVERY MINOR 
                                                                                                                           
 224 See Blevins, supra note 118, at 1832 (describing the liability issues with respect to the vague 
drafting of the safe harbors); Lemley, supra note 166, at 102 (describing the inconsistent ways in 
which safe harbors apply to different claims). 
 225 See Lee, supra note 124, at 234 (summarizing the main aspects of the safe harbors that are in 
dispute); Monseau, supra note 169, at 85 (same). Though the “built-in ambiguities” allow the safe 
harbors to apply to a variety of cases, they can also result in widely divergent opinions. Henderson, 
supra note 122, at 247. This type of uncertainty is exactly what investors are concerned about. Id. 
 
 
 
